Black Flags across West Africa: Exclusive News from the Sahel, part 3

JNIM and the Tuareg FLA, JNIM's relations with AQIM, journalistic parapolitics, JNIM's operations against ISGS, the current phase of the insurgency, and new militant sectors

NOTE: I apologize for the delay in publishing this part. I had been busy with work and my personal life. I have more time now, so I will be releasing full-length pieces more frequently–I will resume the Iraqi insurgency series soon.

JNIM militants standing atop a monument dedicated to the Alliance d’Etats du Sahel in Diapaga, 13 May, 2025.

The latest batch of correspondence from “Flow” covers a wide variety of topics, some entirely new and some already discussed but with new details. As usual, many of “Flow’s” claims are corroborated, though skepticism is still encouraged. There is too much to cover in the introduction but in a word, the situation in the Sahel is extremely severe. The formation of a powerful AQ-aligned jihadist emirate in the Sahel is highly plausible. I expect there to be a serious attempt at it by 2030 at the latest. The details below help explain why.

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March Correspondence

5-6 March

On a purported agreement between JNIM and FLA

We have achieved victory, thanks be to God, Lord of the Worlds. The FLA movement repented from its errors and accepted the project of implementing the Islamic Sharia. It abandoned pagan secularism. We did not make any [ideological] concessions at all, except our agreement that the people of a region are the ones who will take charge of this matter, and that it is not necessary for them to be subordinate to us. This is not a problem for us.

Some may say, “what is the victory in that?” I say, the political authority. Today, the group [JNIM] is imposing itself as the legitimate ruler of the region. Indeed, the [separatist] movements are the ones who come to it [JNIM], not the other way around.

This is not a merger in the real sense. We can call it successful dialogue. The most important thing is that the FLA movement agreed to Shaykh Iyad’s conditions. Any violation will result in the agreement being annulled. As I mentioned before the political status of JNIM is that it rules the front, thanks be to God, and everyone either pledges allegiance to it or cooperates with it.

“Flow’s” claims on FLA’s subordination to JNIM were partially corroborated. The Eid al-Fitr meeting of JNIM’s top leadership curiously included an emissary from FLA. This emissary was none other than Abbas Ag Intalla, whom “Flow” had previously reported was expelled from FLA due to his jihadist ideological leanings. Intalla’s apparent return to FLA as a prominent figure would suggest that the (quasi) jihadist wing of the movement has become too strong to expunge, forcing them to re-instate Intalla to his position. Furthermore, that an emissary from FLA was present in the meeting is suggestive on its own. Were FLA strong enough to ignore JNIM, no emissary would be present. This would match “Flow’s” report here that FLA has largely subordinated itself to JNIM. In a recent statement, Intalla has used jihadist-esque rhetoric to denounce Turkiye’s support for the juntas and their “massacres of Muslims”–a striking echo of JNIM. However, the exact content of the agreement remains unconfirmed. We do not yet know if the FLA has agreed to enforce Sharia.

Deception operations

We do not raise national flags, but this [the use of them] is for camouflage and concealment. The brothers also carry the flags of Burkina Faso and Mali and wear these countries’ national uniforms. All this is for camouflage.

This comment was in response to my observation that in some videos, JNIM fighters were sporting Malian and Burkinabe military uniforms, which is unusual for a jihadist movement. In the months since this exchange, JNIM fighters have used their stocks of uniforms to infiltrate cities and towns for attacks, most recently in Timbuktu.

Macina’s central role in JNIM

Macina is a region, not merely a battalion, and it has people from all of the wilayat [“provinces”]. Even the brothers in Timbuktu province have an effort in Macina. And everyone works under the umbrella of JNIM.

“Flow” previously called Macina one of JNIM’s “social incubators,” giving it special importance to the organization not only as an operational hub, but as a crucial social base. Organizationally, it seems that at least in Mali and perhaps in neighboring regions of Burkina Faso, JNIM “provinces” are branches of the central region of Macina, which serves as the “mother ship.” This would fit the Macina’s historical role in JNIM, as the agrarian question here is particularly pressing, which is central to JNIM’s appeal to the Fulani.

12 March

JNIM’s relationship to AQIM

Brothers, JNIM is led by the organization’s shura council located in the Maghrib because all of the group’s emirs are members of the shura council in the Maghrib. I recently asked one of the brothers who immigrated from North Africa: “What prevents us from repeating the Syrian experience¹ here? It would mean wasting 20 years of work.”

He told me: “It is impossible for Julani to come to the Sahel.² We are very close to Abu al-Fadhl (Shaykh Iyad, emir of JNIM), and we have not seen any indication of this from him. Indeed, Abu al-Fadhl has ambitions even greater than the ambitions of the [other] shaykhs of the organization.” He told me that this man wants to establish Islam in all of Africa, not merely in Mali or even the Sahel. This was his answer.

As for the frequent rumors about separation [between JNIM and AQ], I believe that these are journalistic efforts. The reason for them is the great blessed expansion of JNIM and the group’s possession of eight emirates (that is, wilayat) in more than five countries and its possession of thousands of fighters, thanks be to God. Everyone sees that it has gone beyond the stage of mere organizations, and that is why they [journalists] are working hard [against JNIM].

Clarification: The Shura Council is located in Algeria, but it has expanded into the African Sahel after the organization was able to link its areas in Algerias with its areas in the African Sahel. I do not mean the state of Morocco [Maghrib].

As for Morocco itself, the organization has no jihadist activities due to the tight security group. Anyone [in Morocco] who pledges allegiance to the organization [JNIM] either goes to the African Sahel or to Algeria.

As is well-established on this page, JNIM is not a merely Sahelian organization. Its influence spans West Africa, and its ambitions are massive, which makes the lack of media coverage on it all the more puzzling–you can get away with anything in Africa…

In any case, there is much to unpack here. First is JNIM’s tight organizational and ideological links to Al Qaida, which is the result of over two decades of jihadist efforts. “Flow” has repeatedly made clear that no separation is possible, in no small part due to the fanatical commitment of Iyad Ag Ghaly, whose political biography is worth briefly discussing.

Ghaly has always been a prominent Tuareg leader, but he was initially a secular separatist before becoming an AQ-aligned jihadist. He had fought in several major Tuareg rebellions, the largest of which was the 1990-95 revolt. In 1996, the Tuareg movements entered a ceasefire with Bamako and Ghaly normalized relations with the government, becoming a prominent official and liaison with militants. In the 2000s, he regularly negotiated with jihadists (including AQIM), particularly when it came to hostage releases. Over time, he built strong relationships with key AQIM commanders (for example, his own nephew was in AQIM). In parallel, Ghaly independently came under the influence of Islamism, specifically due to the Tablighi Jama’at school, which he encountered while serving as a diplomat in Saudi Arabia. During this time, he became a strict Muslim and strident Islamist, eventually making contact with jihadists residing in the Kingdom some time around 2010. This move greatly alarmed Ghaly’s employers, so he was recalled to Bamako. He soon left the government and re-entered the militant world. By this point, we can say Ghaly had become an active jihadist.

In late 2011, Tuareg separatists and notables met to form a new Tuareg militant organization.

Present at that meeting was the veteran rebel Iyad Ag Ghaly, who reportedly lobbied unsuccessfully to become the overall leader of the MNLA but rejected in fear of his extreme form of Islamism, as he petitioned for a sharia-compliant Azawad, causing problems for the clan. It is within this context that Ansar Dine was then created. Alongside several Tuareg elders and former rebel leaders who were not put off by Ag Ghaly’s desire for a sharia-compliant Azawad, Ag Ghaly formed his own group, Ansar Dine, sometime between November 2011 and January 2012.³

In most narratives, Ghaly’s formation of Ansar Dine is presented as an essentially opportunistic move due to MNLA’s refusal to appoint him as leader. While this likely played some part, his ideological jihadism was central to the failed leadership bid. In the previous part of this correspondence, “Flow” noted that in 2012, Ghaly insisted on enforcing sharia throughout Mali, a more radical position than even other AQ leaders. Recall that among Ansar Dine’s demands during negotiations was the implementation of sharia as the law of Mali in exchange for Ansar Dine ending its militancy. Already back then, we can see Ghaly’s Pan-African ambitions, now further illustrated by “Flow.” In contrast to Julani, whose career has shown steady moderation (IS to AQ to HTS to now), Ghaly’s career has shown steady radicalization (secular separatism to radical Islamism to AQ jihadism). This is one significant deterrent against JNIM’s separation from AQ.

That such rumors ever even took root is quite puzzling, so it is worth examining where they came from and what possible motives are behind them. “Flow” cryptically blames “journalistic efforts” without much elaboration. This is likely a reference to Wassim Nasr, journalist for France24 and the most prominent proponent of these rumors. To briefly step back, aside from his work on the Sahel, Nasr is known for his work on HTS and Syria.

Wassim Nasr was the first Western journalist to personally meet and interview Abu Muhammad al-Julani, and he is quite supportive of Western engagement with HTS. In jihadist circles, Nasr is (perhaps not unjustly) viewed as a Western spy or at least serving Western interests in “domesticating” jihadists and subordinating them to the West. His relations with HTS are often cited as evidence. Whether he is actually in the employ of the DGSE is separate to whether he is furthering their aims regarding jihadism–which he is. Nasr has repeatedly urged close Western engagement with the new Syrian government (led by HTS), arguing that they are reasonable actors who can be brought into the fold. Most recently, he praised the Trump administration’s decision to greenlight the integration of foreign fighters into the new Syrian army. The essential condition for any of this was HTS’s separation from AQ and distancing from the global jihadist movement writ large.

To return to the Sahel, I suspect that in peddling rumors of potential separation between JNIM and AQ, Nasr hopes to encourage more opportunistic elements of JNIM to break off and fall under Western orbit, thus repeating the HTS experience. In a fascinating recent talk, US Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford discusses an MI5-led program to bring jihadists into the Western fold. In his preparations to meet Julani, he mentions that he had spoken with someone who had already met the HTS chief. I suspect this “someone” was Wassim Nasr, whose connections to the national-security ecosystem are well known. He has repeatedly contributed to CTC Sentinel, is research fellow at the Soufan Center, and is a generally highly-regarded jihadism expert.⁴ It is plausible that Nasr (and perhaps others) sees a similar opportunity in the Sahel as in Syria, and hopes to exploit it. Bringing JNIM into the Western fold would mean that the US and Europe have one less front to worry about in the future. In an increasingly multipolar war, there is less room to combat non-state actors like jihadists. It would therefore be prudent to “domesticate” them before they become too much of a threat. For my part, I consider any efforts to do so in the Sahel to be utterly doomed. JNIM are enthusiastic members of the global AQ network. I do not expect Iyad Ag Ghaly to trim his beard and wear a suit like Julani–or rather, Ahmad al-Shara’.

Lastly, we come to “Flow’s” fascinating reference to “JNIM’s eight emirates in more than five countries” and the organization’s networks in Morocco. The five countries are Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, and Nigeria. The distribution of the eight wilayats is unclear. My speculation is that three are in Mali (Macina, Timbuktu, Kidal), two in Burkina Faso (north and east), one in the Niger-Benin-Nigeria axis, and I’m unsure about the other two. One may be in Algeria, given “Flow’s” striking reference to it as a potential destination for foreign fighters (in this case from Morocco). This is surely with the knowledge of the DRS, again highlighting the curious non-aggression pact between the Algerian state and JNIM. What exactly motivates this? Simple, both sides know that the other can inflict enormous damage and has no interest in declaring war if conflict can be avoided. Furthermore, Algeria has never had very friendly relations with Mali, so it is unconcerned to see the state suffer a jihadist insurgency, so long as the jihadists know not to attack Algeria (which they do). Furthermore, FAMa’s massacres of Tuaregs encourages Algerian Tuaregs to mobilize to defend their kinsmen. The DRS has no interest in interfering with this, so it permits such organizing.

April Correspondence

6 April

On JNIM’s media team

Today’s media team is made up of Tunisian brothers. The problem with filming is technical, not lack of qualified personnel. Filming in northern Mali is extensive because of the availability of technology. The rest of the wilayat are far from the center of the community and do not have advanced equipment, so they film with what they have available. May God bless all of our brothers.

Indeed, some brothers complain to me about Az-Zallaqa Foundation, that it is not adequately performing the necessary role in covering events through the media. Of course, Az-Zallaqa Foundation is not independent. Rather, it is under the direct authority of the security apparatus, which completely controls it. Further, the Az-Zallaqa team is very small, only two brothers from Tunisia.

When tracking the overall quality of JNIM’s media, one can observe a decline since the early period when AQIM itself was more prominent. The original media foundation was call Al-Andalus Foundation, and its releases were very stylish. It was reported that the media team for Al-Andalus was also composed of Tunisians, perhaps the same ones running Az-Zallaqa today…

9 April

On JNIM’s strategic use of media silence

This [silence] is currently [in effect] in the Sorou Valley because JNIM has committed a terrifying massacres against the supporters of the heretic Traore and the VDP. They do not want these terrifying massacres to come to light. Instead, they want to work silently, as there is little remaining in Dedigo region, until it is completely expunged of Traore’s supporters. And God knows best.

This presaged the recent escalation in JNIM’s severe reprisals against communities perceived to be government-aligned. This perception is based on the impressment of local men into the VDP either for military service or for labor to build rudimentary military fortifications. Villagers are often faced with the impossible choice of obeying the VDP and risking JNIM’s wrath or vice versa. We will address an especially severe case further below.

16 April

On JNIM’s battles with ISGS

Commenting on images from 2021 of JNIM defectors to ISGS:

Thank God, all of them were killed, including their leader Maza, in the Tatkarat and Fatli areas. Indeed, at the end of last year, the remaining ISIS [Da’ish] groups in Aribanda pledged allegiance to JNIM, thank God, and the presence of ISIS in Aribanda ended.

Watch the [media release of the] Battle of Tatkarat in Aribanda, May 2024. The operation of the special forces squadrons of JNIM and the killing of ISIS emir Maza of Aribanda. See also Az-Zallaqa Foundation’s November media report documenting ISIS leader Abu al-Izza and his group’s pledge of allegiance to JNIM–in Aribanda, of course.

The Battle of Tatkarat was originally known to JNIM through its spies inside ISIS which led it to mobilize an entire battalion. Imagine an entire battalion of JNIM’s forces in Aribanda, mobilized for that battle: hundreds of motorcycles and a small number of vehicles in May 2024.

Yes, JNIM did indeed penetrate ISIS strongly, which enabled it to win one of the most important battles in Aribanda, the Battle of Tatkarat. Then the ISIS leader of Aribanda himself and his companions were killed in Fatli. After that, the ISIS groups dispersed and in November, Abu al-Izza and his men pledged allegiance to JNIM. They appeared in the Ramadan and Eid publications of JNIM in Aribanda.

Years ago, when ISIS was present in the Macina, Shaykh Amadou Kouffa gave the ISIS members there only seven days to leave. When they did not respond, they were all exterminated. The same thing happened with the Azawad movements [in the Macina] last year. The Macina region cannot tolerate the presence of any other group in the heart of its regions.

This narrative illustrates the circumstances that led to the published defection of the ISGS squadron to JNIM. It also explains the difficulties ISGS has had in penetrating most of Mali. I asked “Flow” to elaborate on his reference to FLA in the Macina:

This is trivial news. There is not a single FLA group in the Macina, for JNIM expelled them a year and a half ago. Before the roads to Bamako is the Macina and the province of Sikasso. There is no FLA [here] at all, but the supporters of the Azawad movements want to attribute any victory to them.

It is impossible for the FLA to exist in the Macina because JNIM has expelled it with great force. As for the issue of the siege of Bamako, it is logical if JNIM wanted to do so. They are already surrounding the capital. Abu Hudhayfah al-Bambari mentioned something like this in the past. They may also bombard the capital with mortar shells if the Malian government does not stop its crimes.

Indeed, what is easier than a siege is to bombard Bamako with mortars and locusts [drones]. I believe this stage is coming if the Malian Army does not withdraw from the north and center.

Its notable that Abu Hudhayfah is Bambara, which is traditionally viewed as the state-bearing ethnicity of Mali, indicating the junta’s lack of legitimacy and JNIM’s increasing appeal beyond Fulani and Tuaregs.

27 April

Again on JNIM’s structure

[In descending order] It has a shura council, wilayat emirs, battalion emirs, and company emirs. The battalion consists of several companies. The one who participates in military operations is usually the company emir and his men. The company emirs are quite extreme, while from the battalion emirs all the way to the shura council, their approach is that of Shaykh Atiya [that is, Atiyatullah al-Libi] and Dr. Ayman [al-Zawahiri].

Those who lead the military activities of JNIM–that is, the field combat–are the company emirs and they are young. The wilayat and battalion emirs participate only in specific battles.

On the new phase of the insurgency, specifically in Burkina Faso

The group is already present on the outskirts of the capital Bamako and even within it. Its military capabilities have increased in areas surrounding the capital through the Khalid bin Walid Battalion in Sikasso Province. The roads of Segou, Sikasso, Kayes, and Koulikoro to the capital are all under the direct influence of the group’s brigades in the Macina, but there are facts on the ground that must be considered.

Today, the group is actually storming the military gates at the entraces to the major cities in the Macina, that is, on the outskirts of the capital. However, the major battle the group is waging today is in Burkina Faso, and huge reinforcements have arrived in Burkina Faso from Mali.

The battle in the Boucle de Mouhoun area, for example, did not intensify and flare up until after the arrival of huge columns of military reinforcements from Aribanda and the Macina to Burkina Faso, specifically to Boucle de Mouhoun. You may have heard about what happened in Soro and elsewhere [referring to massacres].

Indeed, the ongoing battle in Boucle de Mouhoun is one of the most important battles of in the African Sahel since our mujahid brothers arrived here. It is no less important than the 2012 Battle of Kidal due to the geopolitical status of the region, which links thousands of fighters in the Macina to thousands of fighters in Burkina Faso.

Therefore, the Burkinabe Army sought to resolve this axis in its favor, sending its own forces and launching a major military campaign in Boucle de Mouhoun. However, the jihadist war against the Burkinabe Army intensified, and fresh forces arrived from Mali, including hundreds of vehicles [trucks], hundreds of motorcycles, and hundreds of soldiers. The army and its supporters were crushed in Boucle, thanks be to God.

The reinforcements that arrived in Boucle and the Boucle battalions that were already present in the area received crystal clear instructions to use overwhelming military force in this battle; indeed, to carry out field executions of Burkinabe Army personnel and VDP gang members, to never take prisoners, and if prisoners were taken, to liquidate them all.

This is in response to the crimes of the Burkinabe Army and the VDP militia. Also, during the military campaign launched by the Army, the group retreated from many of its strongholds, which were seized by the Army, who then declared victory. It was therefore necessary to use overwhelming force to destroy the Burkinabe Army deployments in Boucle.

Indeed, the military reality today in Boucle de Mouhoun is that JNIM is quite close to the city of Dedigo itself. There are military operations on a daily basis. The guerrilla war has no specific timeline, but the reality on the ground is clear to everyone.

This correspondence preceded the massive May wave of JNIM attacks on Burkinabe towns and settlements. On one day, JNIM struck eight different towns. The most severe attacks were against Diapaga and Djibo, where JNIM went so far as to actually seize these towns. Indeed, in the raid against Diapaga, locals reported the presence of a former mayor of a nearby town–he was now a JNIM militant, indicating just how much the government has degraded. In those attacks, fighters wearing Malian uniforms were seen, corroborating “Flow’s” claim that Malian fighters are flooding into Burkina Faso.

For May, JNIM claimed to have killed ~830, almost double the death toll in April, which was itself over double the reported death toll of March. The violence is rapidly escalating with no end in sight. During these previous months, there was highly relative “calm” in Mali, but JNIM’s victories in Burkina Faso have enabled it to shift resources back to Mali. Just this week, over 100 FAMa troops were killed and over 20 were captured in a massive raid on Boulikessi. A similarly severe raid took place in Dioura. Militants from Burkina Faso were reported to have partaken. The immense significance of the Macina - Boucle de Mouhoun axis is abundantly clear given these operations.

Speaking of, “Flow” again provides color to ongoing events, particularly atrocities. His information about government massacres and JNIM’s harsh reprisals was, as usual, corroborated, this time by Human Rights Watch, which reported that the Burkinabe Army orchestrates major massacres of Fulani villagers in coordination with the VDP.⁵ Interestingly, local Burkinabe media indirectly confirmed the substance of the report, albeit with a very pro-government spin.⁶ JNIM’s policy of reprisal massacres is quite “Zarqawist” in spirit as it intensifies the cycle of violence and ethnic polarization, bringing more and more Fulani into its ranks while degrading the government’s legitimacy and power. At the same time, the group calls on international organizations to denounce the junta for its atrocities, reflecting a more populist approach akin to that of Atiyatullah al-Libi. This dynamic will be explored elsewhere.

On JNIM’s new sectors

Brothers, for months we have been hearing news about new groups of brothers in Nigeria, that they are operating in several regions and that internal photos of these brothers have been published. But honestly, we did not pay attention to this.

The Ansaru group [of northwestern Nigeria] was dissolved and today their name is JNIM. They are part of the sector covering the Niger region, Benin, northern Nigeria, and the Kaduna region of Nigeria.

I wish to speak on the subject of Nigeria, but I cannot discuss it in detail. But frankly speaking, JNIM has a very strong presence in northern Nigeria and the border areas between Nigeria, Niger, and Benin. The Ansaru group was dissolved and merged with JNIM’s groups in that region. The emir of Ansar became the emir of this axis.

Ansaru participated very effectively in the battles of Benin, Dosso, and the border areas. It also has a presence in Nigeria. Now there is no group called Ansaru. It has been dissolved and a single axis has been formed. You may have seen the attack by the Burga State against Benin last week–this attack proves all of this.

Nigeria has long been in the sights of Sahelian jihadists. Analysts have been warning for years that JNIM and ISGS will soon enter the country in force, and that precautions must be taken.⁷ It seems that the Sahelian crisis is now expanding into Nigeria, making it the latest “littoral” state to be afflicted. It is plausible that JNIM will open a war front in Nigeria in the next 6-12 months.

1. Referring to Abu Muhammad al-Julani’s separation from Al Qaida and distancing from jihadism.

2. Meaning for JNIM to take the same path as HTS

3. Caleb Weiss, “AQIM’s Imperial Playbook: Understanding al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb’s Expansion into West Africa,” Combatting Terrorism Center (2022). Link: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/aqims-imperial-playbook-understanding-al-qaida-in-the-islamic-maghrebs-expansion-into-west-africa/

4. To be clear, I greatly respect Nasr’s work and urge others to read it, but the environment in which he sits is important to keep in mind.

5. “Burkina Faso: Army Directs Ethnic Massacres,” Human Rights Watch, 12 May, 2025. Link: https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/12/burkina-faso-army-directs-ethnic-massacres

6. “Le Gouvernement invite toutes les populations installées dans les forêts, les zones d’opération à se soustraire de ces bases de repli des ennemis (Communiqué),” Burkina24, 15 March, 2025. Link: https://burkina24.com/2025/03/15/le-gouvernement-invite-toutes-les-populations-installees-dans-les-forets-les-zones-doperation-a-se-soustraire-de-ces-bases-de-repli-des-ennemis-communique/

7. By far the best analysis is: James Barnett, Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i, “A ‘Sahelian’ or a ‘Littoral’ Crisis? Examining the Widening of Nigeria’s Boko Haram Conflict,” Hudson Institute, 5 April, 2023. Link: https://www.hudson.org/sahelian-or-littoral-crisis-examining-widening-nigerias-boko-haram-conflict