Black Flags across West Africa: Exclusive News from the Sahel, part 2
Jihadist ideology in JNIM battalions, Sahelian anti-Zionism, Ukrainians in the Sahel, JNIM and the Tuareg separatists, rumors of JNIM's separation from AQIM, and more
The second part of my recent correspondence with “Flow,” a source based in Mali, covers topics no less fascinating than those addressed in Part 1. He discusses the ideology of JNIM’s leadership, its commanders, and the fighters and how these interact and differ. The fighters on the ground are said to be true “Zarqawists.” Perhaps most scandalously, “Flow” alleges that Ukrainian operatives in the Sahel have reached out to support JNIM against Wagner–an Azov 9/11 in the making?... These operatives already work with the Tuareg separatists. JNIM has apparently rejected all such offers, viewing the Ukrainians as opportunist spies. However, it continues to work with Tuareg separatists, whom it has effectively subordinated. “Flow” even claims that the Azawad Liberation Front (Front de Libération de l'Azawad, FLA) has entered a political agreement with JNIM. In this discussion, he commented on the genocide in Gaza, revealing how JNIM supporters understand the movement’s struggle in regards to anti-Zionism. Lastly, he responded to rumors from Wassim Nasr, purporting that there is a significant wing in JNIM that seeks to follow HTS’s model and break from AQ. “Flow” explained at length why he believes that such a break will never take place.
All bracketed notes are my own.
January Correspondence Continued
29 January
On JNIM’s recent proselytization campaigns:
The body that performs these [proselytization] tasks is the Da’wah and Hisbah Committee. Of course what distinguishes Koulikoro is its proximity to Bamako. My humble opinion is that JNIM is seeking to mobilize an army in the areas surrounding Bamako to besiege it when appropriate. And God knows best. By the way, these mosques in Koulikoro [depicted above] are among the main mosques.
On jihadist ideology in JNIM:
Most of the leaders of JNIM brigades are extremists, but most of the leaders in the Shura Council are on the path of Shaykh Atiyatullah al-Libi [top Al Qaida leader from the 2000s]. Indeed, not only that, before Ansar al-Islam in Burkina Faso united with JNIM, the JNIM branch in Burkina Faso was weak, yet it was highly critical of them [Ansar].
JNIM was very critical of some Ansar al-Islam groups in Burkina Faso, and it forced the emir of Ansar at the time to expel some because they did not follow the approach of Shaykh Atiyatullah al-Libi. The group’s jurists and members of the Shura Council see Shaykh Atiya as their role model. As for the group’s brigades, they are very hardline like Al Shabaab.
On the juntas’ poor strategic thinking and Wagner’s crimes:
The solution [for the juntas] is to negotiate with the jihadist movements, not to fight against them as the coup regimes do.1 Every crime committed by Wagner mercenaries leads to raising the stock of jihadist movements. Of course, Wagner entered Mali with a green light from America, and everyone knows that. The Muslims who are being subjected to massacres because of Wagner’s crimes see America as the cause.
In short, every crime Wagner commits in Mali increases Muslims’ hatred for this vile and worthless international community, for Muslims see Wagner killing them at the will of this vile international community. This is the new variable in the African arena that did not exist before the days of Shaykh Usama bin Ladin.
Historically, counter-insurgency either takes the form of physical extermination (even genocide) or painful reconciliation with the “insurgent” constituency. Wagner and the juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso have pursued the former course, and they are suffering the consequences. That these massacres and abuses enrage the affected populations is little surprise. What is highly alarming is that these massacres provide ample evidence for JNIM’s international jihadist ideology in these same populations. In other circumstances, these grievances would remain essentially local or national. Here, they are being injected with a radical global perspective. “Flow’s” claim that America authorized Wagner’s entrance is false, but it is notable that he believes this and that others apparently believe it too. This popular rage is fusing with a complete rejection of the international order–that is to say, it is being politicized to devastating effect.
JNIM’s thinking on Palestine:
“Flow’s” comments on the international community led me to ask about the genocide in Gaza, which is the most glaring failure of this “vile international community” today. His answer provided fascinating insights into JNIM’s worldview:
The Muslims of the Sahel hate the Jews intensely, and the situation has become even worse after the horrific massacres in Gaza, which no human being with a shred of mercy in his heart can accept. Women and children have been crushed, and I say that the victory of the jihadist movements in the Sahel would be a great blow to the Jews.
Indeed, the Jews and the Americans know this, and that is why America tried, through Africom, to intervene in Benin and Togo to increase pressure on JNIM. All of these movements believe in the necessity of supporting the Muslims in Gaza and Palestine with weapons, and the necessity of fighting with them against the Jews and the Americans, but these jihadist movements have not yet achieved victory.
There is a great revenge awaiting the American people and the European peoples. I still hold my humble opinion that a day will comes, and God knows when, when thousands of Americans and Europeans will be killed without the slightest compassion for them after the crimes they have committed.2
I asked how JNIM intended to send such support.
Very easily: By smuggling. There are smugglers who can transport weapons to Libya (that is why Africom, the Jewish donkeys, are in Libya), then from Libya to Egypt, and then into Gaza. That is why the European Legion was also established in Libya. However, this requires liberating Libya and liberating Egypt from the Dubayat Gang,3 Haftar, and Sisi’s gang.
On junta territorial control and Ukrainian presence in the Sahel:
They control major cities only. Also, controlling major cities is due to the presence of Wagner mercenaries, who have great experience [in urban affairs], and also because of the drones. If JNIM accepts Ukrainian support, Wagner will be destroyed very easily, but it has completely refused to enter this path.
This comment shocked me, so I asked if there really were Ukrainians in the region, to which “Flow” replied with this highly parapolitical answer:
Yes, of course. The Azawad [Tuareg separatist] movements have received assistance from Ukraine in several areas, such as drones, jamming devices, and others. The Azawad movements have gained significant international political support, the goals of which include using these movements against Wagner and the Russians, and fighting JNIM when necessary.
This was told to me by supporters of the Azawad movements. They are very reliable and have participated in battles. The biggest evidence of this [international support] is that they expelled Abbas Ag Intala from all positions, and he became worthless [to them] because they said that “we”–that is, the Azawad movements–“have international support and we have nothing to do with terrorism and that Abbas has a relationship with [JNIM leader] Iyad Ag Ghaly.”
There is much to unpack here. First, the Ukrainians have been apparently deputized by the West to support Tuareg separatists against Russian operatives in the region. What is extremely striking is that “Flow” adds that they will fight JNIM “when necessary,” suggesting that this is not their primary aim despite JNIM’s much greater influence in the region than Wagner and Russia. Western patronage of Tuareg separatism has a long history dating to bizarre colonial-era racial fetishism for Tuaregs as a lighter skinned people “resisting rule by the black man.”4 Second, at lower ranks, these separatist movements overlap with JNIM, which can be observed in joint attacks on Wagner and the Malian Army. That Tuareg separatist movements feel it necessary to purge JNIM sympathizers in its ranks suggest that the problem is greater than it seems at first glance. Third, JNIM views the West with immense suspicion and prosecutes its war without Western support.
31 January
Again on jihadist ideology in JNIM:
All of the JNIM brigades are very extremist and most of the brigade commanders follow the approach of Shaykh Zarqawi, but they are obedient to their leaders. The General Emirate–that is, the Shura Council–the emirs of the provinces and perhaps the top leaders of the battalions are not as extreme as the emirs of the companies. We can say that they follow the approach of Atiyatullah al-Libi.
Neither party [JNIM or AQIM] believe in the [Muslim] Brotherhood’s or the nationalist approach. Even Shaykh Iyad [Ag Ghaly]–this man that some people think is a nationalist–since 2012, he has refused to be satisfied with northern Mali [that is, Azawad]. He used to say that jihad is an individual obligation and that we must liberate all of Mali and all the lands of Islam, even though the emirs of Al Qaida–i.e., the Emirate of the Sahara at the time–were of the view that northern Mali should suffice.
I ask “Flow” about AQ leader Sayf al-Adl’s recent statements, such as his praise for Western anti-Zionist students, which suggest a more moderate ideology.
Sayf al-Adl is not a religious or legal reference. Sayf al-Adl is a strategic reference and planner for the group’s military action. His political talk is one thing, his military planning another. The military plans in the Sahel and Somalia,5 their general outlines are almost the same as Sayf al-Adl’s plans, with some changes required according to the unique environment of each theater.
Sayf al-Adl said that jihadist should engage in guerrilla warfare and not control cities, nor should they engage in decisive or all-encompassing battles against armies. He said that jihadist should get closer to the people and reduce martyrdom operations, etc. Anyone who intimately knows the jihadists knows that their military activity is an application of Sayf al-Adl’s words.
When the movements of Western students who supported Palestine are praised, this is merely a political position. However, the leadership of JNIM previously called on Western peoples to revolt against their rulers in order to stop interfering in the Sahelian countries during the days of the French occupation of Mali. If the Westerners had come out and done that, it would have been mentioned and praised.
When the Yellow Vests incident happened in France, we saw how the leadership of AQIM exploited it. Before that, Shaykh Usama (may God have mercy on him) called on Western peoples to reject the position of Western governments regarding the war against Islamic ummah and called for a truce with global infidelity. These are purely political positions that have only this dimension.
On rumors of separation between JNIM and AQ, as claimed by journalist Wassim Nasr:
The media team of Az-Zallaqa Foundation and Al-Izza Foundation are one thing. Al-Izza Foundation is still the one that publishes Az-Zallaqa Foundation’s statements and publishes news. When you know this, you will know that the issue [of not advertising JNIM’s allegiance to AQ] is nothing more than new arrangements for the situation in the arena, using the name JNIM locally, for people know this name.
This same thing happened before after the martyrdom of Shaykh Abu Mus’ab Abdul-Wadud. We used only the name JNIM and did not use the name Al Qaida. The group, thank God, is expanding day after day. It is locally known as JNIM and hence this name is officially adopted. Also an official flag was adopted for it (the same flag as the Pakistani Taliban).
What transpired is that both parties, JNIM and AQIM, agreed that the name JNIM should be used only in the Sahel and Gulf of Guinea region. This is to preserve JNIM, and because people do not know the name Al Qaida but they do know JNIM. There were also mistakes that occurred in 2012 and today we are trying to fix those mistakes. Whoever talks about the two parties separating [like Wassim Nasr] knows nothing.
Personally, I know brothers working with JNIM in Mali and Burkina Faso, and these brothers have never spoken to me about anything like this (separation). If something like this was happening, they would have told me about it. In fact, the strange thing is that they always use the name Al Qaida and not JNIM, knowing that the new policy in the Sahel region is that work will be exclusively under the name JNIM.
A key component of Al Qaida’s political vision is that the organization serves as a foundation, or “base,” of Sunni jihadist ideology and movements across the world. It is not necessary in the eyes of AQ that it directly leads jihadist struggles so long as these struggles are sincerely jihadist. It seems that this has been objective has been decisively achieved in the Sahel. Even if JNIM were to split off from AQ, its jihadist struggle would continue due to significant ideological indoctrination among its members. However, “Flow’s” categorical rejection of any idea of separation is good enough for me to believe that Wassim Nasr was simply bluffing.
Over the years, JNIM has repeatedly express interest in negotiations with official authorities. This was true when the French-backed liberal governments were in power, and it remains true now that the Wagner-backed juntas are in power. Amadou Kouffa himself has stated this. What is striking is that “Flow” believes this position, suggesting it is not an entirely cynical proposal from JNIM. There is still time for the juntas to course correct and find a peaceful way out of this crisis, even if it involves highly unpalatable political negotiations with JNIM.
It should go without saying that I categorically denounce such views.
I am not sure what “Flow” meant by this term. In the Arabic, it is: صابة الدبيت
Cf. Remi Carayol, “Le mythe (écorné) de l’« homme bleu »,” AfriqueXXI, 19 January, 2022. Link: https://afriquexxi.info/Le-mythe-ecorne-de-l-homme-bleu
Note “Flow’s” cryptic reference to Al Shabaab in Somalia, suggesting he has insider knowledge on the organization. The recent UN report claimed that JNIM and Shabaab have formed links.