Black Flags across West Africa: Exclusive News from the Sahel, part 1

Jihadist battalions in Ivory Coast, Togo, and Benin. JNIM's non-aggression pacts with West African states. Jihadist rivalries between JNIM and ISGS.

At this point, regular readers of this page are well-acquainted with the individual nicknamed “Flow” who has provided me invaluable information about jihadism in the Sahel and even other areas in which Al Qaida operates. I first encountered him in September of last year, when he explained to me the strategy of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) for victory in the Sahel. We again spoke in October when he responded to my piece from September and provided additional and equally exclusive information, which has since been corroborated by other journalists and the UN’s latest report on jihadism. I continued to correspond with “Flow” in November and December, during which he once more provided fascinating information about jihadism in the Sahel and even Syria, revealing to me the presence of Hurras al-Din in the rebel offensive that toppled the Assad regime.

Our correspondence continued through January into March, the content of which I am finally publishing here. Given the number of conversations, I am dividing this information into several parts, all covering diverse but recurring topics: JNIM’s rivalry with ISGS, its presence in littoral West Africa, its military strategy, its combat operations, etc. Many of “Flow’s” assertions have since been corroborated, again attesting to his shockingly insider knowledge of JNIM and to his reliability as a source. I am forever grateful that “Flow” was willing to share this information with me, especially now that it seems I have lost contact with him. Our correspondence seems to have come to an end, as I have been unable to contact him. Perhaps we will converse once more, but it is anyone’s guess as to when this may be. I hope these transmissions about the jihadist reality in the Sahel have been as useful to you as they have been to me.

For organizational clarity, I have broken the correspondence into several blocks for each day(s) that I spoke with “Flow.” All bracketed comments are my own.

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December-January Correspondence

25-26 December, 2024

On JNIM’s rivalries with ISGS:

Al-Nusra [referring to JNIM] was not always stronger [than Islamic State (IS)] in Burkina Faso. There were periods when there was a great expansion in Dawla [IS] in Burkina Faso, to the point that the leadership in al-Nusra sent Qutayba al-Shinqiti to lead this branch at one point. There is another strategy that al-Nusra is working, and I am keeping it secret now so that no one gets hurt.

The expansion of al-Nusra in Dawla’s areas has already happened, whether in Burkina or Niger. Mali is still facing a dilemma due to the presence of Dawla in southern Menaka, which could lead to an all-out war. Today, the leadership of al-Nusra is trying to avoid a military clash and attract Dawla’s groups to it; and to work on dismantling Dawla internally without a military clash.¹

At this point, I asked “Flow” about the presence of migrant fighters or muhajirin in the Sahel, but the exact question was lost because I accidentally deleted it. I am not so tech-savvy as I used to be…

On JNIM’s geographic scope:

Oh man, immigrants? Let me tell you something that has never been disclosed before: Did you know that there are senior students of knowledge from Mauritania, one of the most prominent regions from which scholars and preachers emerge? Did you know that many of them joined Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin? At their head is the Mujahid Shaykh Julaybib, may God protect him.

Internally, we refer to Hajj Iyad [Ag Ghaly] as the leader of Muslims in Africa and [to JNIM] as the first group in Islamic history since the fall of the Caliphate to storm the Gulf of Guinea and fight there. It is our victorious group. This is its message to every Muslim in Africa: “Do not come to us, we will come to you. The door of jihad will be opened to everyone, God willing.”

On JNIM’s relationship to Al Qaida:

JNIM was built on a unique unity among all the groups here. One of the principles of this unity is that we are affiliated with the Islamic Maghrib branch [Al Qaida in Islamic Maghrib], and that all the battalions have pledged allegiance to this. If this [that JNIM will break from AQ] is true, and I ask God that it is not, then this is the end of the jihad in the Sahel. So far, the situation has not changed.

God willing, we will not allow something like this [separation of JNIM from AQ] to happen. We can only permit the use of the name JNIM in the Sahel and stop using the name Al Qaida because people here do not know Al Qaida. But separation?! I swear to God, I will start an armed revolution, God willing, if this comes to pass. We were ignorant and we did not know Islam (not really, that is) until our muhajir brothers [from AQIM] came.

Some might say that it is in the interest of JNIM to stop attributing itself to Al Qaida, for it is a local group and many people do not care about this link between JNIM and Al Qaida. This is partially true, and we can solve this dilemma by using just the name JNIM, without reference to Al Qaida, while also keeping our promises.²

On JNIM’s refusal to conquer large cities:

We will not burn our brothers in big battles. Our brothers are inexperienced and many of them are new to jihad, so we suffer heavy losses even in small battles, so what about attacking big cities? What I know is that such a mistake [of attacking cities] will not happen, God willing, but there will be an increase in military action, God willing. And God knows best.

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3 January, 2025

One of “Flow’s” comments on JNIM’s presence in littoral West Africa:

There is already a jihadist battalion in northern Ivory Coast. It is the one that severely struck Ivory Coast and with great force when it [the country] attacked us in 2019. It was a secret and today it has become a battalion, thanks be to God.³

9 January

The question arose whether JNIM will seek to take over Burkina Faso or Mali this year. Flow replied:

No. In Burkina Faso, a grinding guerrilla war [will be prosecuted]. Not control.

15 January

On hostage kidnapping:

In my opinion, kidnappings do not express anything. I do not think that JNIM will return to this method again, especially with the new orientations of the group in recent years. The group may continue to kidnap Russians, but not Westerners. As for ISGS, I still hold my opinion about it [referring to previous discussion].⁴

Interestingly, “Flow’s” holds a positive view of ISWAP in contrast to his view of ISGS:

As for ISWAP, I personally respect them. They have a real project and I do not think that, in light of the intense war against them in Nigeria, they will open another front in Doso or elsewhere. But this is just my humble opinion. Also, you must know something: The arena is complex and there are many fronts. You must pay attention to that.

On JNIM’s goals:

At the moment, it [JNIM’s aim] is not a caliphate or an emirate. Currently, the first goal is to expand and spread jihad in most regions of the African continent. I have heard that they have many groups and supporters in Senegal and Guinea, as God knows best. There are indeed jihadist groups of JNIM supporters in Senegal and Guinea, where they broadcast news of the group.

Since the Kidal and Timbuktu Fronts are the social incubator of JNIM, they are rooted in that land. Their goal is only to prevent Wagner massacres and to protect the population, until the right time comes, God willing, to completely overthrow those cities. There is also a security war and da’wa campaign in Kidal and Timbuktu. These activities are private and do not often appear in the media.

On a battle in Nioro:

As I told you before, there are obstacles on the ground that prevent JNIM from launching major attacks: (1) the drones, (2) the fighters’ lack of experience and the great degree of randomness, and (3) the lack of resources necessary for these operations. Therefore, these operations are few. And let us not forget the recent attacks on Nioro that terrified the Malian Army.

I personally witness what happened in Nioro and I have testimonies from the heart of the city, documenting the extent of the crime committed by the Malian Army and the criminal people who support it in Nioro. Frankly, I would not be surprised if JNIM shelled Nioro with mortars, as it is doing now in Bandigara, in response to the killing of the oppressed.

On JNIM’s non-aggression pacts with countries:

There are no [political] deals.⁵ If anyone has evidence of this, please share it with me. But there is one thing that all countries know: Do not fight us and we will not fight you. This message has indirectly reached most of the countries of the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea. For example, Ivory Coast arrested a number of JNIM fighters at one point. They [the authorities] were indirectly contacted and [the fighters were] released.

They said to Ivory Coast, “We do not want war with you, so why do you want war with us?” By the way, one of the leaders of JNIM in northern Ivory Coast was among them. These are not deals, but rather indirect communication through some intermediaries to prevent things from escalating.

23 January

On JNIM’s media strategy:

We never do anything for publicity. We have a terrible archive of battles. We have not published it because we do not want any propaganda.

Despite this comment’s brevity it reveals a great deal about JNIM. The organization is amongst the most prolific AQ branches when it comes to published media, which typically depict skirmishes, battles, and especially war-booty. In recent months, there has been a lull in combat footage despite escalating attacks of severity. This is a deliberate choice to avoid international attention, to which JNIM pays close attention. What JNIM has published is highly concerning, which means that what it has not published, per “Flow,” must reveal especially severe events. In this respect, the organization is taking after Islamic State, which has long used strategic silences to go under the radar. Furthermore, JNIM’s recent Ramadan photosets have shown that the organization is not even slightly afraid of potential surveillance. Large crowds of fighters, commanders, and even top leadership gather at will and without worry. The group is likely sitting on its media archive in anticipation of something much greater.

More on JNIM’s presence and organizational structure in littoral West Africa:

The Muslim Brigades [referring to forces under JNIM commander Muslim] are also present in eastern Fada N’Gourma specifically. It is present in Benin and Togo. Muslim is the emir of Benin and Togo, not the leader Hanifa [another prominent JNIM commander]. The battalions are intertwined with each other. Hanifa is the official Niger branch but they are also present in other regions. All of these are branches of the Macina region [referring to Katiba Macina].

The Muslim Brigades are of North and East Burkina Faso. Ja’far [Dicko] has his battalions in central Burkina Faso. There are other battalions in southern Burkina Faso (a very special area). Ja’far Dicko, for those who do not know, has a secret and participates in the operations [ghazwat] himself, even though he is the general emir of the Burkina Faso region.⁶

27 January

Again on JNIM’s rivalries with ISGS:

Thanks to God and His Guidance, our mujahidin brothers have expanded into several countries and and JNIM has gained the allegiance of new brigades in different countries, praise be to God. Today, ISIS [Da’ish] has no choice but to try to change the jihadist compass again, hoping to force JNIM into entering an open war with them in order to destroy the arena. May God spare us from their evil.⁷

On JNIM’s escalating campaign in Benin and Togo:

My comment on this news: Firstly, Benin moved to stop the expansion of JNIM at the behest of the United States. Secondly, those attacking Benin today are the Hanifa Brigades and their offshoots inside Benin, not the eastern Fada N’Gourma Brigades or their branches. Thirdly, there are groups within Benin who are local and speak the local Beninese languages.

Benin cooperated with Burkina Faso against JNIM, supporting the army against us, and this resulted in the killing of a number of our mujahidin brothers. It was necessary to enter Benin to strike the Beninese Army to avenge our brothers, for blood can only be met with blood. There are also hundreds of Muslims in Benin who have joined JNIM, praise be to God.

These regimes [the Sahelian juntas] brought in the atheist Russians to kill the weak Muslims and try to stop the great jihadist advance in the Sahel. Two years ago, Benin and Togo became more involved in supporting the coup regimes. Togo allowed the Burkinabe Army to pass through its territory to strike JNIM, and Benin sent 3 drones.

Also, Benin, under American orders, established military bases in the border areas to provide the Burkinabe Army with information and logistical support, so it had to be struck to deter it from its wrongdoing.⁸ This is what happened, thanks be to God, and before Benin, the same thing happened in Togo. Blood can only be met with blood, and we cannot forgo the revenge for the martyrs of the group.

1. By this point, ISGS had already suffered two prominent defections to JNIM. In one case, a major ISGS commander was killed by his own two bodyguards who subsequently joined JNIM. In the other case, an entire ISGS unit defected and declared loyalty to JNIM, images of which the group later published.

2. This would mimic Jabhat al-Nusra’s shift into Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS), which ostensibly broke off from AQ but secretly maintained its ties. This did not last long, as JFS soon turned into Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which completely broke off from AQ. “Flow’s” confidence in such an idea for JNIM suggests he believes that JNIM’s leadership does not share Abu Muhammad al-Julani’s opportunism and duplicity.

3. I initially reported this on my Twitter page. I believe I was the first to report it in any Western language. Le Monde just confirmed this claim: Benjamin Roger, “Comment les réseaux djihadistes sahéliens tentent de recruter de nouveaux membres en Côte d’Ivoire,” Le Monde Afrique, 18 April, 2025.

4. See also Points 6-8 here: https://robashlar.substack.com/p/jnim-a-pan-african-threat-new-details

5. That is, JNIM has not entered into any strategic alliance with any country.

6. This demonstrates an enormous degree of confidence within JNIM, both in Ja’far Dicko’s capabilities and in any likely replacement in the event of his death.

7. Note “Flow’s” steadily growing animosity for ISGS. Where before he called them Dawla, here he calls them Da’ish, which is the pejorative name for IS. In a later conversation, he calls them heretics.

8. Benin’s coordination with the US was confirmed by two sources. From local Beninese press: “Sécurité: le Bénin et les États-Unis scellent un partenariat stratégique jusqu’ en 2030,” Le Potentiel, 28 February, 2025. Link: https://lepotentiel.bj/2025/02/28/securite-le-benin-et-les-etats-unis-scellent-un-partenariat-strategique-jusquen-2030/

From Africom itself: https://x.com/USAfricaCommand/status/1900523474168217862