JNIM: A Pan-African Threat - New Details

Since my previous posts revealing exclusive details about JNIM, I have obtained additional information about the jihadist reality in the Sahel. My source is the same individual, nicknamed ‘Flow,’ that I cited in the other two articles. It has become abundantly clear to me that Flow is no ordinary supporter of JNIM. He is a devotee of JNIM and has been for years, if not decades, through its various iterations. He has very kindly agreed to let me publish the information he shares. Over the past months, I have had several conversations with Flow, in which he revealed a number of highly significant items. Unfortunately, most of these conversations (held online) were scrubbed before I could fully document and preserve Flow’s exact words. The points discussed below are written from memory. The reader will have to trust that I am being honest, but I understand if this is too much to ask given the boldness of these claims.

Although I was initially skeptical of Flow’s claims, several events have since attested to his reliability as a source. I will provide just two examples to illustrate why I trust him. First, when asked about JNIM’s view of Hamas, Flow gave this answer on 23 September:

As for the Hamas movement, the words of the people are clear and explicit. We do not disbelieve in Hamas or other Islamic groups, for this causes conflict between Islamic groups and causes a terrible headache in the bereaved Ummah–the Ummah has enough of what it needs. So the relationship with Hamas is to support the good that comes from them and disavow all evil. Also, the conflict with Hamas means diverting the compass from the enemies of the Ummah. From here, statements were issued supporting the operations of October 7. This does not mean we accept Hamas’s actions that violate Islamic law. God forbid! But is it in accordance with Sharia and religion that we should be busy with Hamas’s mistakes while the Jews are slaughtering our people in Gaza?!

This almost exactly matches the rhetoric in Al Qaida General Command’s and AQAP’s eulogies of Yahya Sinwar after his martyrdom. Second, Flow informed me that Hurras al-Din fighters participated in the Syrian rebel offensive that toppled the Assad regime. By this point, I knew Flow had a solid track record, but this was quite shocking and somewhat difficult to believe. After Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (aka Jabhat al-Nusra) fully broke off from Al Qaida to form Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, AQ loyalists split and formed Hurras al-Din. This group became AQ’s official branch in Syria. It agreed to subordinate itself to HTS and give up its distinct arsenal. HTS then spent the next several years suppressing Hurras until it largely ceased to exist in Idlib beyond small cells. The bad blood between Hurras (thus AQ) and HTS is very real, which made me skeptical of Flow’s claim. However, just this past week, outside corroboration came. Several journalists have since confirmed that Hurras fighters did indeed partake in the offensive–notably, against their own leadership’s orders.¹ Therefore, there was a twin incentive to keep this quiet: (1) to keep AQ’s presence in the offensive hidden, thus preserving its image as a revolutionary, not terrorist, offensive; (2) to hide the political splits and disorder within Hurras al-Din’s ranks and chain of command. Yet, Flow still knew of this in the middle of the offensive, and he informed me of it. The reader is still entitled to be skeptical, but I hope this shows why I am willing to trust Flow’s information.

My recent conversations with Flow can be reduced to the following findings:

1. JNIM has logistic networks, fighters, and supporters across West Africa. In addition to the peoples of the 3 Sahel states, JNIM has operatives of the following nationalities: Algerian, Libyan, Tunisian, Chadian, Mauritanian, and Nigerian. In almost all of these countries, JNIM has extensive support and logistic networks.

2. JNIM has begun penetrating theological centers, as in Mauritania. In this country, senior students and teachers of theology have declared loyalty to JNIM. They have their own jihadist shaykh from JNIM, named Julaybib.

3. Algerians are concentrated in senior positions in JNIM and they bring considerable expertise and experience. Many of them are jihadist veterans from the 1990s and 2000s. They act as AQIM’s representatives, thus ensuring close and extensive collaboration between AQIM and JNIM.

4. JNIM has moles and sympathizers in several African armies. For example, the Bamako raid in September was so successful in part due to the collaboration of moles in the Malian Army, who acted as a jihadist 5th column. JNIM has moles in the rank and file of the Nigerien army, and it has sympathizers among the Nigerien officer corps. Most surprisingly, JNIM has sympathizers within the Chadian army. Flow cryptically informed me that JNIM has even penetrated the ‘strategic framework,’ presumably alluding to a broader counter-terror apparatus working in the Sahara.

5. JNIM is well-embedded in the smuggling and criminal networks of Northern Nigeria and Southern Libya. It uses these networks to transport fighters, weapons, and materiel. It is currently developing its drone capabilities.

6. JNIM has infiltrated ISGS. Its current priority is to flip the ISGS branch in Mali to JNIM. There have already been some successes. For example, in northern Burkina Faso, a top ISGS commander was killed by his own two bodyguards who subsequently defected to JNIM. Likewise, an ISGS squadron publicly announced its defection to JNIM, which published images of the ISGS fighters declaring loyalty.² JNIM expects ISGS to declare war, likely beginning with strikes in Malian cities like Gao.

7. There are Iraqis in ISGS leadership positions. They are the most bellicose operatives in ISGS and agitate for immediate war against JNIM. The two groups have periodically entered negotiations to form truces, but these have routinely failed. IS is growing concerned about JNIM since it cannot tolerate successful jihadist rivals to itself.

8. JNIM’s preferred method with villages that oppose it are first to negotiate. In the event that negotiations fail, JNIM forcibly displaces all residents and destroys the village. Flow cryptically said that “harsher methods have not yet been implemented.” Similarly, JNIM is preparing a major assault against ISGS.

9. JNIM has deliberately avoided targeting and seizing large cities to avoid drawing international attention. It aims to escalate its campaigns soon, but is currently preparing so that its support networks are durable enough to withstand international intervention. Several analysts such as Alexander Thurston or Pawel Wojcik had made this assessment, but Flow now provides confirmation.

10. JNIM does not encourage foreign fighters to migrate to itself except where the group has formed extensive support networks, as in Chad. In Flow’s words: “Internally, JNIM refers to Hajj Iyad [Ag Ghaly] as the leader of Muslims in Africa and to JNIM as the first group in Islamic history since the fall of the Caliphate to storm the Gulf of Guinea and fight there. It is this victorious group. This is its message to every Muslim in Africa: ‘Do not come to us, we will come to you. The door of jihad will be opened to everyone, God willing.’”

1. https://x.com/MohamedBinFisal/status/1872895375323086848?t=-CMfW7dXS87SisW1U2mI6w&s=19

2. https://x.com/WerbCharlie/status/1866970967823515683?t=dfCXeke3_KwVwQMPSFOvsQ&s=19