What did the latest UN Report on jihadism say? Part 1
A Somali caliph, IS shifting between Syria and Iraq, JNIM on the move, battles in Puntland...
The UN has published its latest report on jihadist movements across the world and it contains a number of very intriguing details. Such reports from the UN are worth treating with skepticism as they are based on information relayed by local UN member states, who have their own biases and agendas that can be pushed through seemingly objective intelligence on jihadism. The best example is jihadist membership tallies (including one discussed below) which are typically far off from the truth because member states aim either to minimize the threat, thus evading culpability for their own failures, or to inflate the threat, thus securing international backing for “counter-terrorist” efforts. With that said, the information in this report matches that found elsewhere, including my own original research. Let us begin.
A Somali Caliph?
There remained a range of views about the identity of Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, the overall ISIL (Da’esh) leader (see S/2024/556, para. 49). There was growing confidence among some Member States that al-Qurashi was Abdul Qadir Mumin (Somali, not listed), the head of ISIL (Da’esh) in Somalia. If this is borne out, it may signify a deliberate pivot towards a more decentralized operational structure, further from the core conflict zone [referring to Iraq and Syria].1
If Abdul Qadir Mumin is indeed the current IS caliph, then the UN understates the significance of this development, which would represent a historic shift in IS leadership culture and composition. I remain skeptical that Mumin is Abu Hafs due to the importance of Iraq to IS.
The IS movement was founded in Iraq, in the form of Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ), which defines the organization to this day. Despite JTJ’s reputation as a foreigner-comprised organization, it had Iraqi jihadists in top leadership positions from the beginning–several co-founders were Iraqi–and the rank-and-file rapidly “Iraqified,” so that by 2004, most JTJ fighters were native-born. Also, many of these Iraqi jihadists already adhered to an ultra-extreme form of Salafi Jihadism not unlike Zarqawi’s own. Even in 2003, one can recognize key elements of IS in the still-embryonic JTJ. Indeed, in Nibras Kazimi’s words: “In attempting to answer the question ‘where did the latest iteration of the caliphal venture come from?’ a researcher should have been able to discern, to my mind, most of the answers in the period 2003–7, which culminated with the declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq.”2 That is to say, the essential components of the IS movement were all formed and matured during the Iraqi insurgency period. Furthermore, Iraq’s central place in the Middle East has always figured prominently in the minds of the IS movement’s thinkers:
The author of Elam al-Anam,3 meanwhile, makes the case for Iraq, not by extolling Baghdad's association with Abbasid grandeur, but by highlighting its strategic location at the center of the Arab world. Iraq also has ample resources that could sustain a new state.
No matter how much it professes to be international, the historical homeland and abode of IS remains Iraq, something which even the current IS spokesman has said.
It is little surprise, then, that every IS leader since Zarqawi has been an Iraqi. Indeed, one top IS leader was alleged to have forbidden non-Iraqis from becoming the caliph.4 Such tensions were present immediately after Zarqawi’s death, with several AQI and MSC5 leaders resenting the assumption of Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, an Egyptian, to leadership. To preempt these rivals, Muhajir had purged “unreliable” AQI members, likely targeting Iraqis who were displeased with the Egyptian’s authority. With the nomination of Abu Umar al-Baghdadi to caliph, the hold of Iraqis over the IS movement was achieved. Abu Umar’s successor, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, solidified the Iraqi hold over IS leadership, appointing nearly all key leadership positions to fellow Iraqis. Even IS’s early aesthetics emphasized the organization’s Iraqi roots. The flag was Abbasid black, and the caliph was named after Baghdad, the marvelous capital of the Abbasid Empire in particular and of the Islamic Golden Age in general. This historical and cultural baggage would strongly deter any major leadership shift to Africa.
Mumin’s Somali identity presents other problems as well. To be the caliph, one must have Hashemite and Qurayshite ancestry, which is not uncommon among Arabs, but quite difficult to even construe for Somalis. Even if Abu Umar and Abu Bakr did not meet these conditions, it would not have been especially difficult to construct an acceptable lineage. This is not the case for Mumin, whose Darod clan membership has only a tenuous link to the Hashemites and Qurayshites. In sum, there is still considerable reason to be skeptical that Mumin is the IS caliph.
Snapshot of the Middle Eastern Heartland
In Iraq, the high tempo of the Government’s counter-terrorism operations led to the death of around half of the ISIL (Da’esh) top-level leadership there. Notably, in August, the deputy wali of ISIL (Da’esh) in Iraq and 13 others were killed. It remained to be seen if ISIL (Da’esh) in Iraq could replenish its fighters and resources in the face of such pressure.
The Coalition’s campaign against IS in Iraq has been highly successful in recent years, bringing the organization to its lowest point yet, even worse than the difficult Sahwa years.6 After decades of violence and bloodshed, Iraq today is quite peaceful for the most part, though remnants of IS still lingers. However, the fall of the Assad regime presents challenges. Although the situation in Syria has so far remained largely peaceful, the new regime is still highly unstable and faces many trials. The country is still not unified and rationalization of the new army is still in preparation. This creates ample room for IS to operate. According to some reports, IS seized weapons stockpiles amidst the initial chaos of the regime’s collapse. Fragmentation of the new HTS-led regime would create a highly permissive environment for IS to operate, allowing it to bolster its flagging efforts in Iraq.
There are reasonable grounds for concern. The Dayr al-Zawr based journalist Zain al-Abidin recently reported that in December, over thirty IS fighters left Syria for Iraq, which they entered with the help of corrupt border police. His report is quite disturbing and worth quoting in full:
On 21 December, a group of ISIS [Da’ish] fighters who were in the Syrian desert managed to cross into Iraq, taking advantage of the SDF militia’s, at the time, fragile control over the eastern countryside of Raqqa, specifically the areas of Ma’adan and Sabkha. The group is apparently not the only one, but we were able to monitor this one, consisting of 30+ fighters who crossed the Euphrates River at the time and headed to a village called Jazrat al-Mila’aj through active smuggling networks there that support the organization and have been operating for years. They reached areas controlled by the SDF militia and continued towards southern Hasakah to an area whose name we are withholding, where there are ISIS hideouts. Then they crossed the Iraqi-Syrian border and reached Iraq through a second smuggling network linked to the first, Syrian-based one, and in collusion with Iraqi soldiers on the border. This crossing is confirmed, and there may be other groups that have also crossed there. It seems that the Iraqi border wall [has broken]. As I said, the file of corruption is very big!
In a related context, yesterday [12 January], a group of ISIS fighters arrived in the town of Ma’adan in the eastern countryside of Raqqa. They reached the outskirts of the town near the Syrian desert and spoke with a number of residents of the area there. They took water to drink, and asked them about several people from the remnants of the regime, along with people of the area and some tribal leaders. After that, they left the area. As soon as the news reached the local armed groups in service to the new government [HTS], the latter set up checkpoints near the main street. The checkpoint of the old regime, which was empty at the beginning of Ma’adan, was activated by the General Security [HTS intelligence service].
To this day, the Islamic State organization, or ISIS, has not attacked any point of the new Syrian government forces, and there is a 90% decline in militant activity after the fall of the regime. However, the organization’s activity continues in the areas of the desert supposedly “controlled” by the SDF. Here, the organization has claimed responsibility for several operations.7 [All emphases mine]
Mere days after this report, IS successfully struck an Iraqi Army patrol in Diyala–where there is stubborn IS presence–killing several high-ranking Iraqi officers.8 In February, Zain published a similarly disturbing follow-up:
Confirmed information indicates the successful crossing of new groups of ISIS fighters towards Iraq during the middle of last January 2025. The fighters came from the Syrian desert and reached the areas controlled by the "Qasd" militia PKK/SDF in Hasakah. Then, through a professional smuggling network with relations in the corrupt Iraqi military system, they were able to enter Iraq and their numbers ranged between 30-40 elements who crossed in batches. This is the second crossing to Iraq and was preceded by another successful crossing, and the majority of the fighters who crossed this time are mostly Iraqis and Lebanese. It seems that the organization is reorganizing itself in Iraq, parallel to a significant reduction in its presence in Syria, coinciding with a freeze on all its activities in Syria, whether in the areas of al-Jazirah "controlled by the SDF", or in the government areas, as operations decreased throughout the country:
98% in areas controlled by SDF
100% in government controlled areas
Meanwhile, security reports have been issued in Iraq indicating an increase in the organization's activity there, something I had noted in previous old tweets.
The border area with Iraq, extending from Baghuz to Rabiya, is still weak in terms of security. These areas are run in Syria by the SDF militia, and in Iraq by army forces and the Iraqi Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces militia. All three are characterized by very great corruption that facilitates the mission of ISIS.
The Iraqi Border Forces Command said that it had completed a 90 km long concrete wall from Mount Sinjar to the Rabia crossing west of Nineveh on the Iraqi-Syrian border strip. It seems that ISIS is racing against time regarding this part and is exploiting the opportunity here to focus on crossing into Iraq specifically before tightening the wall procedures, which I expect will not be difficult to penetrate thanks to the corruption on the Iraqi side.9
Elsewhere, Zain reported that the Iraqi IS fighters in Syria have almost entirely returned to Iraq, where they are currently re-strategizing. The IS presence in the Badiya seems to have been entirely evacuated.10
Unsurprisingly, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have quietly requested the US to remain in Iraq to continue conducting anti-IS operations.11 Every single successful anti-IS strike in recent years has been under Coalition auspices, whether in the form of US air strikes, ground raids, or intelligence sharing with the Iraqi Army. The PMF’s anti-IS role has been minimal, as the organization has no real history of successfully fighting IS independently of the Coalition. PMF leader Hadi al-Amiri himself admitted that it was US air strikes that defeated IS in Iraq during the 2014-17 period.
Black Flags in the Gulf of Guinea
Notably, there was a southward advance towards the borders of the Gulf of Guinea countries and the Niger. An increasing interconnection was observed between these groups and their respective central organizations, as well as, in the case of JNIM, connections with other Al-Qaida affiliates such as Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP, QDe.129). These linkages bolstered their propaganda capabilities, which were a focus of considerable effort. As the primary driver of violence in the Sahel, JNIM exerted growing pressure on security forces, local militias and foreign auxiliaries.
On my previous Twitter account, I had noted the aesthetic convergence between JNIM’s and AQAP’s media output. One could easily observe this in the growing use of AQAP nasheeds in JNIM propaganda. Privately, I had informed other analysts of seemingly growing connections between JNIM and Al Shabaab (AS). My local source in Mali, nicknamed “Flow,” alluded to communications between the two organizations, with JNIM advising AS on tactics. In recent conversations with another local source, he also alluded to such communications. It is unclear if he meant the same line as that referred to by “Flow.” If he meant another line, then this could indicate that there are semi-open back-channels for AQ-aligned jihadists to communicate across Africa. Incidentally, the growing integration between JNIM and the broader AQ network is evidence against recent theories (e.g., from Wassim Nasr) that JNIM may split from AQ.
The expansion of JNIM enabled it to extend its recruitment base beyond its traditional Fulani and Tuareg strongholds, including other ethnic groups such as the Bambara, thereby enhancing its military capacity and integrating new communities into its fold. This integration was central to its political strategy of positioning itself as a critical local actor. However, it could weaken the group’s internal cohesion and raise governance challenges.
The most notable case of JNIM’s increasingly diverse recruitment is the raid on Bamako in September, in which one of the inghimasi was a Bambara fighter, named Salman al-Bambari.12
JNIM directed its propaganda towards defending marginalized populations and victims of abuses, frequently releasing videos highlighting security force and auxiliary abuses to legitimize its narrative. Simultaneously, it continued violent attacks along key roads to isolate strategic localities and increase pressure on capitals.
Pieter van Ostaeyen has observed this unsettling trend in JNIM’s propaganda in his Sahel Monitoring series for Counter Extremism Project. During 2024, JNIM reported on massacres committed by junta or Wagner forces almost every month, while conveniently omitting or justifying its own massacres of civilians. Meanwhile, its attacks continue to escalate in severity and frequency, with this past February being quite dire. The group struck Djibo four different times, probing for weak points to seemingly prepare for a large offensive on the town.
In addition, JNIM exploited its position in eastern Burkina Faso to counter ISGS expansion into the Niger, advancing into Nigerien territory and threatening the capital, Niamey. Southward, JNIM activities extended towards Benin, Ghana and Togo. While Ghana had not been subject to terrorist attacks, Benin and Togo experienced increased attacks along their northern borders. Member States highlighted concentrations of JNIM fighters in southern Burkina Faso serving as launching points for operations in the Gulf of Guinea countries where JNIM sleeper cells existed.
The rivalry between JNIM and ISGS has grown in intensity, with increasingly frequent clashes and now even defections. The ISGS commander for northern Burkina Faso was killed by his own two bodyguards who then defected to JNIM. Similarly, an ISGS unit defected to JNIM, which published their declaration of loyalty. Meanwhile, JNIM increasingly encroaches on the littoral states of West Africa. Ghana has been spared attacks because it has entered into a non-aggression pact with JNIM.13 As for Benin and Togo, JNIM has escalated its campaigns because it allegedly perceives these two countries as bulwarks of US presence and as a conduit of US aid to the Sahelian states. The group has embedded itself in the north of Benin, reportedly forming jihadist battalions from locals. Likewise, it has begun recruiting in Togo, with some Togolese fighters active in neighboring Burkina Faso. Additionally, JNIM has reportedly formed a jihadist battalion in Cote d’Ivoire, although this country remains largely safe. The exact activities and organizational structure of JNIM in this region will be discussed in a forthcoming piece.
ISWAP remained pivotal to ISIL (Da’esh) objectives for the Sahel and West Africa regions. Its leadership had been instructed by ISIL (Da’esh) to identify, train and prepare fighters to join other ISIL (Da’esh) theatres. It was, however, unclear where the fighters would be deployed. ISWAP support for ISGS continued, with collaboration on ISIL (Da’esh) propaganda and the occasional exchange of personnel.
“Flow” had informed me that there are Iraqis in the ISGS leadership. This remains unconfirmed, however there is circumstantial evidence to support this claim. First, we know that Iraqis are the “elite” in IS and act as the glue holding the international organization together. Second, the latest ISWAP film revealed foreign Arabs in its ranks, confirming their presence and indicating that there are others. It seems that in West Africa, ISWAP is the main “hub” for foreign recruits who are then sent off to other IS branches and cells in the region.
Black Flags in the Horn
In 2024, ISIL (Da’esh) in Somalia experienced a rapid growth in foreign terrorist fighters, which nearly doubled the size of the group. Recruitment campaigns targeted regional Member States and Yemen, attempting to integrate foreign terrorist fighters into structured hierarchies. Despite its initial success in recruitment, Member States reported that the recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters had slowed due to difficulties in integrating fighters into narrow clan-based structures, cultural barriers and the severity of conditions, leading to sustained defections, which limited the group’s expansion. Member States also reported a number of arrests in originating or transit countries.
Since surviving an air strike on 31 May, Mumin had taken measures to limit the group’s exposure to unnecessary external attention, refocusing efforts on securing financial sustainability through enhanced extortion in its strongholds. Revenue was allocated to strengthening operational capacity, the procurement of advanced weaponry, and investments in unmanned aerial vehicles. The operational capabilities of ISIL (Da’esh) in Somalia had evolved, marked by advancements in weapons and technology. The group employed unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance and limited explosive deployment, with recent tests conducted in the Tuurmasaale and S/2025/71 10/24 24-24682 Toga Jeceeleed areas. It is assessed that the programme was aimed at building suicide unmanned aerial vehicles.
It has long been suspected that IS-Sumal is a primarily foreign-born organization. This suspicion has been proven correct during Puntland Forces’ recent offensive IS in the Cal Miskaad mountains. Nearly all IS-Sumal fighters in the published images and footage have been foreigners. Puntland locals report that foreign recruitment and drone manufacturing were integral parts of IS-Sumal’s strategy:
Locals who are familiar with the situation in Puntland stated that the group (IS-S) had been pursuing a dangerous plan for the last two years. They claimed it was a conspiracy originating from one of their leaders (Faahiye).14 They said he advised the group against carrying out any attacks within Puntland. Instead, he suggested they build an army primarily consisting of foreign fighters, approximately 10,000 [!!] strong and significantly enhance their technical department, focusing on drones and explosives. According to locals, the group’s current size is significantly below its initial goal, even reaching as low as less than a thousand fighters.15
The recent offensive has so far dealt severe blows to IS-Sumal, but remnants remain and will take time to eliminate. Let’s turn further to the south:
Al-Shabaab was observed to have a developing relationship with the Houthis that was described as transactional or opportunistic, and not ideological. One Member State reported that Al-Shabaab held at least two meetings in Somalia with Houthi representatives in July and September, in which they requested advanced weapons and training. In return, Al-Shabaab was to increase piracy activities within the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, targeting cargo ships and disrupting vessel movement as well as collecting ransom from the captured vessels. During this period, Al-Shabaab was reported to have received some small arms and light weapons and technical expertise from the Houthis. […]
Al Shabaab’s ties with Ansarallah developed through the latter’s relationship with AQAP in Yemen (to be discussed in Part 2). Researcher Michael Horton reports that the nexus between all three organizations is the weapons trade.16 His analysis largely matches that of the UN. Anecdotally, I had heard a case of the Somali Coast Guard intercepting an arms shipment headed for the south, which is Shabaab territory.
To be continued
All bracketed comments are my own. Unless otherwise indicated, all block quotes are from the linked UN report: https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/71
Kazimi, ‘“What Was That All About?” Flawed Methodologies in Explaining the Origins of ISIS (2003–2013),’ Bustan: The Middle East Book Review 8, no. 2 (2017). Link: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/bustan.8.2.0151
Referring to Elam al-Anam bi Milad Dawlet al-Islam (“Informing the People About the Birth of the State of Islam”), a document published by ISI’s “Ministry of Sharia Commissions.” It justified the formation of the “Islamic State” at that particular time. Cf. Nibras Kazimi, “The Caliphate Attempted: Zarqawi’s Ideological Heirs, Their Choice for a Caliph, and the Collapse of Their Self-Styled Islamic State of Iraq,” Hudson Institute, 1 July, 2008. Link: https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/the-caliphate-attempted-zarqawi-s-ideological-heirs-their-choice-for-a-caliph-and-the-collapse-of-their-self-styled-islamic-state-of-iraq
Omar Dhabien, “The Centrality of Iraq and Syria to the Islamic State’s Caliphate,” Jihadica, 13 February, 2025. Link: https://www.jihadica.com/the-centrality-of-iraq-and-syria/
Al Qaida in Iraq, Mujahidin Shura Council
Cf. Aaron Zelin, “Remaining, Waiting for Expansion (Again): The Islamic State’s Operations in Iraq and Syria,” Hudson Institute, 5 December, 2024. Link: https://www.hudson.org/international-organizations/remaining-waiting-expansion-again-islamic-states-operations-iraq-syria
https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1887030019316195703?t=OOwNJYq6ioPcYW5b_f_vzg&s=19
https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1896856230456606839?t=n2MYXvzhp_FKkT2K4pK93Q&s=19
Qassim Abdul-Zahra, Abby Sewell, “Regime change in Syria has Iraqi factions backtracking on push for US withdrawal,” Associated Press, 31 January, 2025. Link: https://apnews.com/article/iraq-us-islamic-state-isis-pmf-withdrawal-coalition-b9194ed8e8ad944b15aaf7e41337912c
Pieter van Ostaeyen, “Al-Qaeda’s Brazen Attacks in Mali’s Capital Bamako,” Counter Extremism Project, 27 September, 2024. Link: https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/al-qaedas-brazen-attacks-malis-capital-bamako
David Lewis, Maxwell Akalaare Adombila, “In Ghana, Sahel jihadis find refuge and supplies, sources say,” Reuters, 26 October, 2024. Link: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ghana-sahel-jihadis-find-refuge-supplies-sources-say-2024-10-24/
Referring to Abdirahman Faahiye Isse Mohamud, the “governor” of IS-Sumal.
Published on 20 January: https://x.com/AAGA_CAWLAN101/status/1881524972038029646?t=GEVmq7a7Xkksgs1kgyh-zg&s=19
Michael Horton, “Looking West: The Houthis’ Expanding Footprint in the Horn of Africa,” CTC Sentinel 17, no.11 (December 2024). Link: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/looking-west-the-houthis-expanding-footprint-in-the-horn-of-africa/