Black Flags across West Africa: Exclusive News from the Sahel, part 4

United (Islamic) States of Africa, JNIM in Multipolarity, Again on JNIM & FLA, JNIM's power in Mali, Encroachment on Nigeria, Recent Raids on Djibo and Diapaga

11 May, 2025: JNIM fighters pose in front of a portrait of Captain Ibrahim Traoré during the raid on Djibo

“Dear friend, I am a well-known individual and not unknown at all. Even many of Dawla’s elements in the Sahel–and some people in the Levant–know me well.”

So said the Malian source, nicknamed “Flow.” He has certainly become well-known to readers of this page. We have come to the last batch of my correspondence with him from these past few months–in this case, May. As always, “Flow” provides fascinating insights into jihadism in the Sahel, this time with great focus on Nigeria alongside many other topics, some new and some old. Let’s jump right in.

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May Correspondence

6 May

On JNIM’s planned polity

United Islamic Wilayats is our aim. The same thing [always]. This was the project of Shaykh Abu Musab Abdul-Wadud [aka Abdelmalek Droukdel].¹

Each battalion will become an army, then an emirate, then a state, and then all will unite to form the United Islamic Wilayats in Africa at the bare minimum.

It’s oddly amusing that JNIM has its own version of the “United States of Africa” line. Except this one isn’t a meme. They are quite serious about this project, with severe consequences in store for the region.

On JNIM’s place in a multipolar world

This process [of final victory] is complex and will take a long time. What is essential today is the process of winning hearts and minds, and creating a certain reality that will be imposed upon everyone. We see this clearly today in Mali, where JNIM is working to impose itself as the state and existing authority, and is working to force everyone to recognize it as such.

It is an inevitable reality. Today, France, the West, and America have major problems affecting their security and economy. They will not return to the Sahel again, especially if the Ukrainian issue intensifies. And don’t forget China. The American economy is also suffering from severe debt, and the moment we are in is the weakest moment ever for the West.

The main reason for France’s escape from the Sahel is economic distress. Indeed, France cannot invade on its own. The economic cost is very high. We directed the bullet of mercy into the chest of the French Crusader army, by expanding into Macina, then into Burkina Faso, as you saw in the course of events.

We have truly dealt them a mercy killing. France has lost its mind after these expansions, and today there are massive armies in various regions of the African Sahel. Neither France nor Europe can fight these great armies in the Sahel for any sustained time. Their economy will collapse, especially since the local authorities are in their weakest state now.

Forget the economic and industrial power of the West–the reality of battle is different. Such a battle requires a large military apparatus consisting of various military divisions and significant air assets. Most importantly, it requires extensive intelligence support, which is very expensive. All this must take place in the barren desert, far from the luxury of Europe. Imagine that!

This answer is fascinating, as it demonstrates a very keen sense of the emerging multipolar world and the opportunities it creates for actors like JNIM. “Flow’s” analysis is correct. The West cannot afford another enormous intervention like the one against IS in Iraq and Syria. Such an intervention would divert not only from the war in Ukraine or the imminent war against China but the Israeli genocide in Gaza. The West is fighting in many theaters. JNIM seemingly knows this and hopes to seize its chance. Hopefully, it isn’t just the jihadists who will take advantage of multipolarity…

Another interlocutor claimed that JNIM had failed in Boucle de Mouhoun despite a seeming presence since 2023. “Flow’s” responded.

It isn’t true at all [that JNIM failed in Boucle]. Indeed, Boucle de Mouhoun did not witness major conflict until a few months ago, nor did the group [JNIM] have a large presence there, as you claim. Rather, most of JNIM’s presence was in the north and east [of Burkina Faso]. Today, we have seen the result of the events of Boucle de Mouhoun, which is the absolute and complete dominance of the soldiers of JNIM. These are the facts.

What is transpiring today in Boucle is exactly what JNIM had planned: To lure the Burkinabe Army and the VDP militias into a guerrilla war that would leave no stone unturned. In the end, most of the VDP militias were killed in combat and the Burkinabe Army effectively collapsed, leaving only groups in urban areas.

If you don’t believe me, go to Boucle de Mouhoun and film yourself supporting the tyrant Traore. I challenge you. If the soldiers of JNIM do not arrest you, then blow your head off, and toss you into the wells, I will be a liar ahahahaha [sic].

Again on JNIM’s ties to FLA

It is strange that it is conceivable for Al Qaida, with its Salafi Jihadist background, would cooperate with another organization such as FLA, which has national and separatist goals–and has suspicious relations with French and Algerian intelligence.

The group is [politically] independent and rules most of the Sahel regions. Most tribes deal with it and recognize its authority. The Azawad Movement [FLA] has recognized the group’s rule and submitted to God’s law like the rest of the tribes. There is no reason to fight them yet.

It’s striking how much offense “Flow” takes at the notion that JNIM and FLA are politically cooperating. He sees the relationship as one of FLA’s subordination to JNIM, which seems to be the case from open sources, but must still be verified. His reference to FLA’s ties to French and Algerian intelligence are also notable. In a recent French documentary, it was revealed that FLA had sent operatives to Ukraine to receive advanced drone training and returned to instruct the rest of FLA.² This confirms “Flow’s” previous allegation of the deep links between FLA and Ukrainian intelligence, and to me, strongly suggests the existence of links to French intelligence. It is extremely doubtful that the DGSE would not be aware of such extravagant operations. The Algerian role is unsurprising, as Algeria has always supported Tuaregs to irritate Bamako. Furthermore, Algiers is highly displeased by the massacre of Malian Tuaregs at the hands of FAMa or Russian mercenaries. These massacres provoke the mobilization of Algerian Tuaregs, and the state has no reason to interrupt this, if not actively facilitate it.

On JNIM’s power in Mali

Even in the far north, JNIM is very strong. Look at what they did in Boni, Gossi, and Timbuktu in recent weeks. The solution is negotiation, accepting Islamic law and expelling the infidels–then the leadership of the Sahel will be given to the leader of Muslims in Africa: Hajj Abu Hamza Iyad Ag Ghaly.

8 May

On an unclaimed attack

In about two days, in Kayes in western Mali, near the capital, Bamako, one of our brigades managed to burn valuable trucks–worth millions of dollars–belonging to the Malian Army. Az-Zallaqa did not officially claim responsibility for the attack, but it was claimed internally, through an audio recording released by the brigade’s emir and documentary videos.

On JNIM’s presence in northwest Nigeria and competition with ISGS

Things are not like this [that ISGS controls this region]. There is an important strategic axis between Niger, Benin, and Nigeria. This axis is completely controlled by JNIM due to hundreds of brothers, whether remnants of Ansaru, groups from Burkina Faso, or groups from Niger. This axis is the most important axis in that region, and we have placed hundreds of brothers there, which is the most important to us.

The group I am describe is the one that operates in vast areas of Benin, near Fada and Dosso in Nigeria. Our brother Abu Usama is the emir of this axis. There are also many brothers in Burga state near Nigeria. This is the most important axis in the region.

On JNIM’s presence throughout Mali

The massive military infrastructure that our organization has built up in Macina and southern Mali is very important because this is the path to Bamako. That is the reality. Certainly, the northern regions are our strongholds and provide a social incubator to us and our brothers, but in the last instance, the road to Bamako does not pass through the north but the center and the south.

There is a huge presence of our brothers in Kayes, this is true, and is for the suffocation of the financial system around Bamako. As for the issue of expansion into Senegal and Mauritania, these are separate matters. We have many supporters in Senegal, and I will leave it at that. As for Mauritania, we have a significant presence in many of the border villages of the country.

We are disturbed by the actions of the Senegalese government, which betrayed us [sic] and participated with FAMa in the war against us in Kayes. This is a declaration of war against us. We are able to deter the Senegalese government, but we prefer to avoid a clash with them. However, if Senegal’s quarrels do not stop, there will only be war.

Indeed, it will be a surprise to the Senegalese government. If they do not stop messing around in Kayes, the strength and expansion of JNIM brigades will be a nasty surprise for them. We did not want war with them, and we hope that Senegal will leave Kayes.

The Macina region of JNIM reached the Guinean border, west of Bamako, last March [in 2024]. I heard that there are many supporters in Guinea, and there are also Guinean fighters in Macina and Burkina Faso.

“Flow’s” claim that JNIM had enormous forces in Kayes and western Mali was proven correct by recent attacks, where JNIM struck seven towns and cities, plus three industrial sites.³ This region was previously untouchable to JNIM (and its predecessors). The group sustained heavy losses in this attack, so high-ranking JNIM leader Mahmoud Barry has announced a siege on the cities of Kayes and Nioro du Sahel.⁴ The supposed “betrayal” by Senegal is quite interesting. It would suggest there had been a non-aggression pact of some kind. Lastly, the reference to Guinea again highlights JNIM’s ambitions to storm the littoral states, the threat of which has begun to finally dawn upon the relevant authorities.

On JNIM and the Nigerian bandits

Now the Ansaru group has been dissolved after the arrival of huge reinforcements from Niger, Burkina Faso, and elsewhere to the emir of Ansaru, brother Abu Usama. Everyone was united under the command of brother Abu Usama, and this important axis has been well secured. Today’s bandits do not dare attack brother Abu Usama.

One of the most important leaders of JNIM sent several messages to the bandits in the areas where our brothers operate. He said to them: “We do not want war with any party that has attacked us–but if you do, we will not ignore any injustice. We will strike you with thousands of soldiers from the various wilayat of JNIM.” He added that repentance is better for them.

Although we have focused primarily on jihadism in the Sahel, banditry is another enormous force, particularly in northwest Nigeria. For perspective, in some years, banditry has caused more deaths than jihadism in the country. Some have feared that there may be a merger of jihadism and banditry, but this misunderstands the basis of both phenomena.⁵

Banditry is essentially apolitical, as the actors’ aim is profit, while jihadism is ultra-political, as the actors’ aim is political revolution. Bandits do not seek to create a new social or political order like jihadists. In fact, they often oppose such efforts because these would eventually crackdown on banditry to enforce the law. Indeed, bandits and jihadists view each other with suspicion, if not contempt or hostility. However, at the same time, jihadists and bandits will tactically cooperate for opportunistic reasons, such as weakening mutual enemies. Furthermore, both benefit from the conditions of state collapse that their actions engender. While they may dislike one another, they ultimately benefit from each other’s presence over that of the state, as this creates a highly permissive environment for their own aims. In this sense, the relationship is symbiotic but antagonistic.

From the jihadist perspective, the banditry-induced state collapse in northwest Nigeria is a great opportunity. On the one hand, the severe weakening of state power means that there is increased room to maneuver. On the other hand, the beleaguered population will turn to any political force that will end banditry and restore the rule of law. There is an informal two-stage strategy at work. First, destroy the state in the region, which has mostly been the work of bandits. This severely weakens, if not removes, the most serious threat to the jihadists. Second, destroy the bandits one by one and establish one’s own socio-political order. By its very nature, banditry is highly fractious and divided. The bandits are not led or united by any one leader or network. They are all independent, though they all mingle with one another, and some may be closely connected with each other. Oftentimes, bandits will ferociously fight amongst themselves to seize control of particularly profitable areas or to steal each other’s loot. Each bandit group is thus much more easily defeated than banditry as a whole.

A highly motivated and disciplined actor like JNIM is therefore at a great advantage. Once embedded in the region, the task is to deter and then defeat bandits. Currently, JNIM has deterred bandits, but once it is strong enough, it will likely open a front against them to establish a proper wilayat or even emirate in the region. In the meanwhile, the Nigerian state becomes increasingly helpless–unless it acts with great swiftness while the strategy is still in its early stages.

The history of JNIM’s relationship with Ansaru (the group “Flow” mentions above) will be the subject of another piece, as there is no space here.

11 May

On JNIM’s devastating raid on Djibo in Burkina Faso this May

The big Djibo attack in late 2023 was a random strike.⁶ Although the military base was overrun, the ignorance of the company’s emir exposed the brothers to drone strikes. However, the Burkinabe Army was in good fighting shape. Since it was armed with drones, it would have been better to launch a quick raid and then withdraw. Attacking the main military base in broad daylight was a fatal mistake, as everyone has witnessed.

Today, something quite different transpired. The attack was late at night. A major battle took place at the main military base and BIR 26⁷ was destroyed. The Burkinabe jets feebly tried to strike but fled after minutes. The battle continued for hours, but what is essential here is that the movement was swift in moving from one place to another. Add to that the presence of supporters inside the city who helped the brothers. The critical element here is that attacks took place in other places, which scattered the Burkinabe Army.

Let us return to the 2023 attack. Burkina Faso claimed to have destroyed JNIM in Djibo. Today, they have been exposed as liars. I heard that dozens of army and VDP soldiers were slaughtered in Djibo, the camp was destroyed, and everything in it was seized. There are videos that will be shortly published, God willing. There is also the important information about the Battle of Souli.

In the Battle of Souli, some soldiers fled and sought help and requested planes to transport the dead and wounded. Souli is not as important as the Djibo region, but it was struck in order to disperse the Burkinabe Army, especially since those areas have a good deal of drone activity. The most important attack in my view is the Spasi attack, near the capital.

17 May

On the permeability of borders

JNIM has thousands of fighters in Burkina Faso. We do not need reinforcements from Mali, but the reinforcements that have arrived are due to the internal unity between the wilayat of JNIM. The battle is the same in every wilayat.

Not long ago, reinforcements from Burkina Faso arrived in Bandiagara to crush the Dozo militias. In the battle to crush the pagan Dozo militias in Bandiagara–ending in the destruction of most of them–there came a whole battalion, fully armed, to Bandiagara and Sevare from Burkina Faso.

In general, Shaykh Umar al-Fulani is the most supportive of our brothers in Burkina Faso. Shaykh Umar is one of the most prominent leaders of the Macina region.

On the cryptic “Mahmuda” group in northwest Nigeria

By God, brother, I am a person who speaks only the truth. I hate lying and stay away from it, so I must say that I do not have any real information about the Mahmuda group. But I do have information about a large presence of brothers in Nigeria. There is good news from those regions, with involvement from northern Benin, eastern Burkina Faso, and the Dosso areas [in Niger].

We know for sure that there are brotherly groups in Nigeria. This is 100% confirmed, but I have no information of the names of those groups, for this area is very remote and there is a great deal of internal secrecy about the Dosso axis in northern Benin and Nigeria and the axis in Burga state. The brothers said that they had infiltrated into Benin and Nigeria.

The Burga attack in the last period was carried out by groups from within Nigeria and infiltrated into Benin. Now, Nigeria has declared war on us in the border regions and we are strong enough to respond in kind, God willing.

“Flow’s” comment about the secrecy about operations in northwest Nigeria is quite revealing. That someone as well-informed as him is not in the loop would suggest that JNIM is preparing something big there.

On JNIM’s method of expansion

Brother, most of the external wilayat–that is, outside Mali–were established through cooperation with other groups that were supported. Today, I am telling you that the Ansarullah group has enthusiastically rejoined. They are making a great effort in their area. Indeed, this was the seed of most external wilayat, meaning outside northern Mali.

It is worth noting that JNIM was formed as a merger for five constituent jihadist groups, which likely influenced its “merger and acquisition” style of political expansion.

Again on JNIM’s raid on Djibo

Our brothers in JNIM are still in the environs, specifically they are on the outskirts of teh city and at its gates, so they are not exposed to bombardment. The Burkinabe Army has failed and cannot do anything. Burkina Faso wanted to deploy BIR 9 in Djibo, but this did not happen because all roads to Djibo are already under JNIMs’s control.

At this moment, BIR 9 is supposed to be deployed to Djibo after the destruction of BIR 26 but this has not happened yet. There are thousands of fighters in northern Burkina Faso, determined to wipe out the army of murderers of women and children. We are not easy prey for the Burkinabe Army, thank God.

Indeed, in the north, those fighting the Burkinabe Army are the sons and brothers of the Army’s victims. There is nothing but revenge–no dialogue or negotiations, but warfare until the entire Burkinabe Army has been annihilated, God willing.

There has been no change in the guerrilla war plan, but the idea is that the major barracks in northern and eastern Burkina Faso have been destroyed, as have many BIR brigades. Thousands of fighters have therefore been prepared to fill the vacuum left by the destruction of the Burkinabe Army positions in these most important areas.

If the security vacuum in the north and east is not preemptively filled, then the Burkinabe Army will return and carry out horrific massacres against local peoples. Now, filling this void in a smart way, while avoiding losses from drone strikes, is the only solution to expelling the Burkinabe Army from the north and east.

This is the gist of the fighter who appeared in the video [of Djibo’s conquest], saying that they wanted to liberate the eastern regions of Burkina Faso. This is the meaning of his words.

In the end, God willing, the goal is the capital: Ouagadougou. This is the ultimate goal of the war, and it starts specifically from the north.

On drone strikes

There is [air] bombing everywhere. That’s just life. What is necessary is to adapt to the bombing, nothing else. The key thing is to preserve the military infrastructure of the brigades of JNIM and to ensure that losses are minimal and manageable. This is transpiring on the ground.

Burkinabe air assets do not allow for much bombing. When the air force bombs a target, ten to twenty brothers are killed, one or two vehicles and several motorcycles are lost. These are minor losses compared to the enemy’s losses. Increasingly, there will be no further bombing due to the modesty of the Burkinabe air force.

Another interlocutor paraphrased Mao, stating: “The mujahid must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea,” to which “Flow” added:

That’s right, especially in the case of JNIM. Most of the members of the brigades and battalions are from their regions. This awareness has greatly contributed to the progress of jihad in those regions–as did preserving and promoting the name JNIM (instead of AQIM), which has played a great role in this. Political awareness is absolutely essential.

But the most important thing is weaponry. Mashallah in Djibo, Souli, Sandry, and Niger. We obtained weapons worth millions of dollars, maybe enough for an entire battalion, thank God. This means the revival of the Military Committe of JNIM. That is what matters most. This is in addition to control of Djibo and Diapaga, the most important cities in the north and east.

The most important thing in all of these events is to obtain weaponry. There are thousands of new mujahideen in need of equipment. The Military Committee cannot provide equipment for all of these brothers, so the spoils of war are absolutely critical for now. Spoils means a revival of the Military Committee, which means more battalions.

20 May

On JNIM’s long war against the West and now Russia

For ten years, JNIM was immersed in the war with France, sacrificing almost the entire first and second rank of leaders and thousands of soldiers. Then, anonymous individuals come and accuse us of working for France!

The first rank of emirs–most of whom were leaders from the 1990s, along with the founding brothers of Ansar Dine–were all killed fighting against France. This is a huge loss, as the group lost nearly all of its cadres. this is what made Abu Walid [ISGS leader] dare to attack us in the first place. He thought he could do something in light of these losses.

O God, we are satisfied with all your decrees and we thank you for everything. So the West’s fight went on for ten years–where were these anonymous individuals? What was their position on the coup regimes’ massacres of our people in Mali and Burkina Faso? What was their view of the Wagner atheists?

God willing, the destruction of what remains of atheist Russia will be in Mali. Here, thousands of zealous young men joined the cause of JNIM, and their goal is to take revenge on the Russian atheists, God willing. Here in Mali, there is total rejection of any negotiations with the Russians. There are also major attempts to develop drones in order to burn the Russians in the heart of their military bases, God willing.

Due to the consistent strikes of the mujahidin–thanks be to God first and foremost–the space within which the Russians can operate has significantly shrunk. Their soldiers no longer venture outside their military bases. It has become difficult to reach them, but soon, God willing, they will be destroyed by aerial bombardment from Islamic drones.

“Flow” has repeatedly made clear his and JNIM’s intense hatred of Russia and Wagner, whose actions have greatly contributed to the intensification of Sahelian jihadism.⁸ When questioned by Wassim Nasr, JNIM second-in-command Amadou Kouffa went so far to say that Wagner has been a gift to recruitment because its atrocities make many young men flock to JNIM. So accelerates Al Qaida’s conquest of large regions of the Sahel…

1. The founder of AQIM. He was killed in 2020 in a French raid.

2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PWNavdEnuB8

3. https://x.com/WerbCharlie/status/1940447270081827211?t=uhq6HIEokJPgmOMjTfJ5CA&s=19

4. https://x.com/brantphilip1978/status/1940519447846076487?t=ScXx44wsEIfmeNRJp6LruQ&s=19

5. Cf. James Barnett, Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i, Abdulaziz Abdulaziz, “Northwestern Nigeria: A Jihadization of Banditry, or a ‘Banditization’ of Jihad?,” CTC Sentinel 15, no. 1 (January 2022); James Barnett, Murtala Ahmed Rufa'i, “A ‘Sahelian’ or a ‘Littoral’ Crisis? Examining the Widening of Nigeria’s Boko Haram Conflict,” Hudson Institute, 5 April, 2023.

6. The reference is to a different attack two years ago.

7. Bataillon d'Intervention Rapide (Rapid Intervention Battalion)–elite units of the Burkinabe Army dedicated to fighting insurgents. They have been implicated in numerous significant massacres of civilians.

8. Cf. Matteo Maillard, “La chambre rouge de Wagner : quand les mercenaires russes exhibent leurs crimes sur Telegram,” Jeune Afrique, 24 June, 2025.