Notes on the U.S. Military's 'Study of the Insurgency in Anbar Province', pt. 4

Chapter 5: 'Anbar: Insurgency Grows, Strengthens, Elections (2005)' pt. 1

Al Qaida in Iraq insurgents bombing an American base in Fallujah, c. 2005

Note: Page numbers refer to Chapter 5 of the Study. Where necessary, administrative language has been omitted from quotations to ensure clarity. Content remains unchanged. Unless otherwise stated, all emphases are mine.

Post-Fallujah II State of Affairs

Insurgency Dispersed

As discussed in the previous part, the Second Battle of Fallujah was a major defeat for the insurgency, forcing reorganization elsewhere in Iraq. The strategy to open a second front by dispersing half of Fallujah’s garrison to neighboring cities failed. This contributed to the massive manpower losses during the battle, which exceeded 4,000 killed or captured, including key commanders like Umar Hadid. Further, the loss of Fallujah removed an important insurgent operating base. With the city under firm Coalition control, the surviving fighters had to disperse and regroup, primarily to Baghdad, Babil, Ramadi, and the Haditha corridors.

A byproduct of insurgent dispersal from Fallujah was the radicalization of local fighters in other regions, who began to adopt Salafi Jihadism. As its new main base, Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI) opted for Ramadi and the Hit-Haditha Corridor, where Coalition support and presence was weak due to the insurgent murder and intimidation campaign since the summer of 2004. This effort was likely led by Hamid Dawud al-Zawi, the Haditha AQI commander, whom we will meet further below. After rebasing, AQI’s recovery promptly proceeded. They set up a training camp in Haditha to replace the lost fighters from Fallujah, while funding from the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, rebuilt networks in Anbar. Financing flowed from prominent clerics and NGOs, through the UAE into Iraq, specifically Ramadi and Baghdad. These efforts soon showed success: ‘An event held at the end of January 2005 was a testimony to AQI's recovery. AQI leadership felt secure enough to hold a memorial service for Umar Hadid in Amariyah on January 27. It was even attended by the leadership of AS [Ansar al-Sunnah], Jaysh Mohammed, and some smaller Iraqi Salafist groups.’ (4) Note the presence of non-AQI representatives in the memorial. As discussed before, a key feature of the insurgency was permeability across groups. One could ideologically sympathize with one group while holding membership in another, although in this case, the groups all shared a similar ideology.

Another major result of the defeat at Fallujah was the emergence of the Sunni Arab Resistance (SAR), or insurgent forces open to reconciling with Baghdad. The defeat led some insurgents to reconsider their opposition to the Coalition-backed Iraqi government. They continued to fight the Coalition and its Iraqi allies but were willing to negotiate a political solution. The Coalition officially dubbed these insurgents the SAR. This was part of a broader, though temporary, trend where Sunni leaders hoped to protect Sunni interests through official channels. The most prominent SAR leader was Muhammad Mahmud Latif (MML), head of the Ramadi Shura Council (RSC) and highly respected insurgent commander.

In early 2005, Latif left Ramadi for Hit to convince other insurgent leaders to press for a political solution after their defeat in Operation AL FAJR. Contacting senior leaders of the Dulaymi tribal confederation, MML asked them to serve as intermediaries between the insurgency, the Coalition, and the Iraq Interim Government (IIG). This decision may have been prompted as much by his own perceived weakness as by a desire to negotiate with the Coalition. Like many SARs, MML feared the rise of AQI and Zarqawi's extremist interpretation of Islam. (5)

The RSC was not united on this skepticism towards AQI. As mentioned in the previous part, RSC leader Mohammed Daham had replaced Umar Hadid as Zarqawi’s top lieutenant, which caused tensions with Latif. Further, at the grassroots, many SAR fighters continued to collaborate with Sunni Religious Extremists (SRE) like AQI:

Nevertheless, of the 10,000 Sunni insurgents estimated to be active by the Coalition at this time, 30% are believed to have been SREs, 45% SARs, and 25% criminal. It is important to note that the attitude of individual groups varied a great deal depending on the local environment. SRE/SAR differences did not rule out mutual collaboration. In many cases, membership within insurgent groups was fluid, with street-level insurgents moving easily between different groups. (5-6)

This insurgent permeability will continue to be a major motif in our study. The author’s classification of ‘criminal’ insurgents is uncharacteristically imprecise. Almost every insurgent group financed themselves through criminal activities, especially cross-border smuggling, so technically all insurgents were ‘criminal.’ The author is likely referring to those fighters whose criminality was strictly self-serving as opposed to serving a political end. However, this distinction is admittedly often unclear because in many cases, Salafi Jihadism is an expression of organized crime and warlordism. For example, in the Gaza Strip during the 2000s, several Salafi Jihadi groups (the most prominent being Jund Ansar Allah) formed and began to challenge Hamas. At the root of their animosity and ideological fervor was a desire to control organized crime in the Strip.¹ Similar disputes would later be central in AQI’s (then its successors’) fraught relationship with the Sunni tribes.

Election Troubles

In the run-up to the January 2005 elections, the political outlook in Anbar was gloomy despite improvements for the Coalition since Fallujah II. The provincial government, based in Ramadi, was largely immobilized by the insurgent murder and intimidation campaign, while the governor was weak and ill-respected. Of all settlements, Fallujah was the only one under firm Coalition control, but it was also affected by the widespread Sunni apathy for the elections and politics writ large:

The Coalition and the IIG also sought to engage Sunnis in the political process by encouraging participation in the elections. This was no easy feat, as the elections were opposed not only by insurgents and Anbaris angry over Operation AL FAJR, but also by local Sunni leaders and incumbent officials at nearly every level. There were two main reasons for this opposition from local leaders: 1) fear they would lose their current standing and influence, and 2) concerns about insurgent violence. As a result, the individuals who should have supported the political process (the incumbents) were instead trying to depress turnout in the belief that it would protect their jobs.

Individual cities had additional issues that would keep participation in the elections low. Many Fallujah residents were completely ignorant of which parties and candidates were running for office, believing that their only option was to pray that the right people were elected. In Khalidiyah as in much of Anbar, residents regarded basic necessities like electricity and water as more important to them than abstract concepts like elections. There was serious concern that if they voted under their real names, the insurgents would get the voting registers and target them for supporting the elections. A further concern was that the Shi'a would impose their "distorted" views of Islam on the country. (7-8)

The Coalition attempted to circumvent this by meeting with tribal leaders to obtain their political support for the elections. Although some expressed sympathy, most of them were too intimidated by the insurgents or had already lost significant support from their own tribesmen due to real or perceived closeness with the Coalition. Meanwhile, the Shia parties–the Dawa, Islamic Dawa, and Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)–formed a large bloc, called the United Iraqi Alliance, which only worsened Sunni perceptions of the political process: ‘For many Anbaris, the absence of any major Sunni candidates appeared to confirm insurgent claims that the elections were an American plot to install a Shi'a dictatorship in Iraq, further contributing to the boycott.’ (9)

The influence of the insurgency on the Sunni boycott of the elections and the political process cannot be understated. ‘While SAR insurgents were open to reconciliation with the IIG [Interim Iraqi Government] in theory, MML urged boycotting or sabotaging the January elections to demonstrate Sunni influence in Iraq. His view was seen by many as extremely radical at the time, but came to be accepted by other insurgents later in 2005.’ (6) Zarqawi’s opposition to the elections went farther than Latif’s:

he denounced the elections, referring to the candidates as "demi-idols" and declaring those who voted as kuffar (unbelievers) a clear threat to the security of those who took part in the election. In keeping with insurgent propaganda themes, Zarqawi stated that the Coalition was holding the elections in order to bring the Shi'a to power in Iraq. As a demonstration of his power, Zarqawi released a video [see screenshots] of Salem Jaafar al-Kanani, Prime Minister Allawi's political director, who was forced to read a statement urging Iraqis not to cooperate with the Coalition before being killed. (9)

Salem Jaafar al-Kanani’s final moments. Getty Images seems unaware that their watermark on this image implies they had some involvement in its production. I wonder if the Kanani family is aware that Getty profits from the snuff film of Salem Jaafar.

In response to Zarqawi’s threats and his continued attacks on Shias, the Badr Corps (paramilitary of SCIRI) formed the Mukhtar Battalion, a Shia death squad which ostensibly targeted the worst SREs, but in reality targeted ordinary Sunnis.² This organization and others like it were soon integrated into the Ministry of Interior–which itself was soon led by a key Badr affiliate, Jabr al-Solagh–whose activities mainly consisted in extreme sectarian violence against Sunnis.³ The most infamous form of this was the electric drill torture-execution. All of this was backed, protected, and overseen by the US, per Guardian:

The Pentagon sent a US veteran of the "dirty wars" in Central America to oversee sectarian police commando units [such as Badr] in Iraq that set up secret detention and torture centres to get information from insurgents. These units conducted some of the worst acts of torture during the US occupation and accelerated the country's descent into full-scale civil war.⁴

This violence later culminated in the mass sectarian cleansing of Baghdad, where US-backed Iraqi security forces and Shia militias systematically expelled Sunnis, ending decades of mixed coexistence in many neighborhoods.⁵ It should go without saying that this violence did nothing to protect Shia civilians, end the occupation, or rebuild Iraq–but it did contribute to Sunni antipathy for the Iraqi government.

AQI’s and other groups’ threats against the elections were thwarted by the Coalition’s effective counter-terror measures, but they successfully dissuaded the Sunni population from voting. Of the ~750,000 expected votes in Anbar, only 16,588 were actually cast, with the single largest turnout being in a Shia-majority city. The lowest turnout was in Karmah where not one vote was cast. The election results showed strong performance for Shia and Kurdish parties, which together took over 70% of the vote, while the most ‘Sunni-friendly’ party, Ayad Allawi’s Iraq List, took only ~13% of the vote. Allawi’s weak performance is no surprise given his role in the destruction of Fallujah and his resolute opposition to the insurgency, both of which severely weakened his legitimacy among Sunnis. Indeed, one need not look beyond the candidates on the ballot to understand the Sunni boycott: the Shia and Kurdish parties were out of the question, while the ‘Sunni’ party was led by a man who had killed many Sunnis. At the provincial level, the Iraqi Islamic Party (the local Muslim Brotherhood branch) won in a landslide, taking 34 of 41 seats. This reflected the above-mentioned trend where Sunni elites were temporarily open to the political process: “Despite the widespread Sunni boycott in Anbar, many Anbari political parties adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach toward the new national government.” (12) Even the insurgency largely followed suit after the elections:

Interestingly, the insurgency as a whole also adopted a "wait and see" approach, some because of logistical difficulties and others due to a desire to participate in the political process. Those who wished to continue the fight had the necessary manpower and munitions to surge attacks but now lacked the necessary planners and expertise because of losses suffered during Operation AL FAJR. The result was a lull in fighting across Anbar, suggesting that insurgent capabilities had temporarily peaked during the period of attacks in the run up to the elections. (14)

Stirrings on the Euphrates

Coalition Strikes

In February and March, the Coalition respectively launched Operations River Blitz and River Bridge to disrupt known insurgent networks. Coalition forces preceded the first operation with a series of raids in the Husaybah-Baghdad corridor. Once River Blitz commenced, they launched another series of raids around the Haditha area. This successfully disrupted the insurgent groups active in those areas, leading to the arrest of 117 detainees, including senior AQI battlefield commanders. One of these commanders was Hamid Dawud al-Zawi, better known as Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, first Emir of the Islamic State.⁶ Zawi had been a long-time member of the native Iraqi Salafi underground and fierce opponent of the Baath Party–in 1993, he was fired from the Haditha Police due to his Wahhabi views. After the invasion, Zawi took arms and formed his own group, Jaysh al-Taifah al-Mansurah, which became an AQI-affiliate group in 2004, when he was recruited by JTJ⁷ founders Abu Anas al-Shami and Abu Muhammad al-Lubnani. Zawi’s group continued to exist, but his formal membership switched to JTJ/AQI, in which he rapidly became a key battlefield leader. His arrest temporarily weakened AQI presence in Haditha, which was affected by the region-wide insurgent dispersal from cities raided by Coalition forces. Fighters and leaders alike fled to remote parts of Anbar or entirely different provinces, like Diyala, Salahuddin, or Nineveh. Operation River Bridge was even more disruptive since it targeted key leaders and facilitators of the insurgency. Planned attacks were canceled, networks weakened, and leaders either escaped or detained. Further, in two major cities, the population became much more pro-Coalition than prior to the raids:

The most notable improvement was in Hit and Haditha, where residents became far more pro-Iraqi government and pro-MNF after the operations. This may have been because the situation in the two cities had deteriorated so severely due to intermittent troop presence before RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE. Insurgents had enforced on both cities all the trappings of an Islamist totalitarian theocracy: secret police, shari’a courts, hadd punishments, intense propaganda, concentrations of foreign fighters, and an oppressive murder and intimidation campaign to deter local resistance. (21)

Recall Bernard Fall’s two key insights into revolutionary warfare.⁸ First: ‘revolutionary warfare equals guerrilla warfare plus political action.’ Second: ‘When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being out-administered.’ The insurgency’s goal was not merely the end of Coalition occupation, but the creation of a Salafi Islamist government. It aimed to do this through the measures stated above. Thus, ‘totalitarianism’ aside, the author’s assessment of residents’ views is likely correct. The ouster of the insurgents’ Salafi Jihadi reign would have been a welcome relief, especially as the Coalition operations had not caused much damage to the cities, so the population did not suffer as it had in Fallujah. However, the Coalition’s further attempts at re-stabilization encountered issues from the Ministry of Interior. The provincial governor fired the deputy provincial police chief, who was viewed as sectarian against Sunnis, but the Ministry forced the governor to rehire him. Similarly, the ‘Shi’a Public Order Brigade in Fallujah, accused by the largely Sunni population of heavy-handed tactics and disrespect for local women, purged several members in an effort to address these local concerns.’ (21-22) This effort did not succeed as the Public Order Brigades (and the Ministry of Interior) had been heavily infiltrated by Shia sectarian forces:

PUBLIC ORDER BRIGADES: 2005: In January 2005, after the election, the new government led by Ibrahim al-Ja'fari, the Ministry of Interior (the Ministry responsible for national-level police forces) came under the control of SCIRI and its Badr Corps when former SCIRI and Badr Corps (Organization) commander Bayan Jabr became Minister. Using a purge of officers, SCIRI increased its control. In early May 2005, three brigades of counter- insurgency commandos (the Wolf and Volcano Brigades–paramilitary commandos) and the Scorpion Brigade (intelligence search and destroy forces) operated in a number of areas. Allegations exist that as a Shi'a dominated (and Muqtada al-Sadr controlled) force these commandos operated as death squads [cf. above and notes 2-3]. Most of the commandos were trained in [REDACTED - I strongly suspect this originally said ‘Iran’]. (22)

One can observe a subtle difference in the orientations of the Sunni and Shia insurgencies when it came to the invaders. The radical Sunni insurgent view was one of absolute rejection and opposition. Nothing short of the end of the post-2003 order and the expulsion of the Coalition–in Marxist terms, national liberation–would suffice. In contrast, the radical Shia insurgent view was more ambiguous. For them, the Coalition was a vehicle through which Sunni political power could be destroyed and Shia political power cemented. The Badr Corps’s and SCIRI’s hijacking of the Ministry of Interior is highly illustrative. Rather than fighting the Coalition as such, these two organizations made sure to secure their own place in the post-2003 order, which they then used against their main rivals, the Sunni forces. The intersection of sectarian politicking and great power militarism would have disastrous consequences for Iraqi society. Once known as a highly pluralist and multicultural country, Iraq would descend into unspeakable violence, from which it still has not recovered, as can be seen in demographic maps of Baghdad.

Green: Shia-majority, Red: Sunni-majority, Blue: Christian, Orange: Mixed or ‘State of Transition’

Effects on the Insurgency

The successes of Operations River Blitz and River Bridge were temporary and even self-defeating to an extent. For example, AQI implemented new operational-security measures in response to the raids. Fighters were each issued three ‘kuniyat’ or aliases to be used among fellow insurgents and on false IDs. Mid-level leaders also entered into regular rotation of region and position (e.g., ‘cell leader to commander to planner to supervisor to facilitator’). The group also expanded its information operations, which consisted in:

• recruitment efforts

• “winning hearts and minds”

• anti-Coalition propaganda

• published speeches and statements by insurgent leaders like Zarqawi

• claims of responsibility for attacks to include releasing videos of the attacks

• explanations of the goals and strategies of the groups (28)

These activities often extensively overlapped, but the fifth was the most striking in the context of global Jihadism. Although attack and execution videos were already an element of Jihadi movements–particularly the Chechen Jihadis–AQI was at the forefront when it came to its media, which was regularly released, spectacular, and well-edited. There is a clear through-line from the camcorder footage (see the header image of this article) of the Iraqi insurgency to the feature-length films of Islamic State, most famous of which is the Salil al-Sawarim (Clanging of the Swords) series. Already in the 2000s, other jihadi movements found themselves having to mimic the content released by AQI, which raised the standard for sympathizers across the globe. AQI and its successor organizations would constantly raise the bar by obsoleting its own media practices, even within a series–the fourth entry of Salil al-Sawarim is far more sophisticated than the first.⁹

Another response from AQI was to worsen and utilize Anbaris’ frustration with persistent power outages by prioritizing attacks against power lines, pipelines, and substations. The electricity sector was already in severe distress due to the ongoing war and to government incompetence which exacerbated the issue. Although not located in Anbar, AQI’s war on Baghdad’s fuel supply is illustrative. In 2004, the insurgency had attacked oil infrastructure 264 times, and in 2005, by late February, it had staged over 30 sabotage attacks on oil and gas lines that fed Baghdad.¹⁰ Indeed:

in November, December and January, in widely scattered attacks, insurgents simultaneously struck all three crude oil pipelines feeding the Doura fuel refinery in Baghdad [thus isolating the city from all sources of oil and oil products - R. Ashlar]. The refinery is the nation's largest producer of gasoline, kerosene and other refined products. During that period, more than 20 attacks occurred on a set of huge pipelines carrying things like oil, kerosene, gasoline and other fuels to Baghdad from oil fields and refineries in the north.¹¹

This created a highly perverse cycle in which the lack of oil reduced electrical power, while the lack of electrical power reduced oil production. A key byproduct of this cycle was to sabotage the Coalition’s plans to privatize Iraqi oil production. If the physical means of extracting, refining, and transporting oil were destroyed, these plans would be rendered impotent, or at least significantly hampered. So effective were the attacks that the Coalition and Iraqi government officials alleged that former regime specialists and holdovers aided the sabotage. The electricity minister even said: ‘Their intelligence is much better than the government's.’¹² By the same token, AQI’s new campaign thus accelerated the destruction of Iraqi productive forces, and with it the material basis for pluralist Iraqi society. One key cultural benefit of modern industrialism is that it forces diverse peoples to set aside their differences and live together in peace. You cannot care too much about tribe, sect, or ethnicity when everyone works on the same assembly line and lives in the same neighborhood. The steady dismantling of Iraq’s industrial apparatus brought tribal and sectarian allegiances to the forefront as there were increasingly no other ties left. This could only benefit groups like AQI.

Further, the effects of Operations River Blitz and River Bridge went much deeper than AQI’s surface-level responses:

Because neither RIVER BLITZ nor RIVER BRIDGE was designed to permanently clear, hold, or build Anbar province, they had three unintended consequences. First, some insurgents simply kept quiet or fled only until Coalition forces left. They then resumed their murder and intimidation campaigns. Second, the displacement of insurgents into previously untouched territory gave them the opportunity to build new terrorist networks. And third, the disruption of financial networks led to a considerable rise in criminality throughout the region, as insurgents scrambled to find alternative funding for their activities. (23)

The first consequence was especially felt in Hit and Haditha, whose populations we noted were glad to see the insurgents suppressed and dispersed. Once they returned, the insurgents exacted their revenge against notable collaborators, while attracting new recruits through major financial incentives ($5000 sign-on and $500/month salary). The second consequence was felt in western Anbar, to where the insurgency had been displaced and established new networks:

The increasing concentration of insurgents in western Anbar led AQI leader Ghassan Amean to coordinate with Quwwat Allah al-Tharib to regain influence in Haditha and then expand their operations to a larger area. In addition to Quwwat Allah al-Tharib, AQI also enlisted al-Asa'ab al-Iraq and Salafia Takfiria to assist in these efforts, leading to increased coordination between insurgents in Husaybah, Haditha, and Rawah. As many as 1,000 AQI fighters were reportedly active in Husaybah, armed with mortars, RPGs, and AK-47s. (24)

This issue was especially pronounced in the small towns and villages, which up to this point had been largely ignored by both the insurgents and Coalition. For example, Ramana became a new AQI transit hub, while Dulab and Albu Hayat became staging areas for AQI’s attacks. Some towns, like Akashat, fell under total insurgent control. With active assistance from local leaders, including the local ING commander, AQI set up a VBIED¹³ production site and used the city as a meeting area for insurgents from Al Qaim.

At the same time that AQI was rapidly establishing in western Anbar, Muhammad Mahmud Latif also gained major influence in the region. The existing tensions between Latif and AQI over his openness to political reconciliation were worsened by the Association of Muslim Scholars’ (AMS)–with whom Latif was allied–latest fatwa. They forbid attacks on Iraqi National Guard [ING] forces, to which AQI’s response was unsurprising: ‘AQI increased dramatically their kidnapping and murders of ING soldiers. The Special Police Commandos in particular were targeted with car bombs and all but one company deserted the unit.’ (24-25) It is worth underscoring the insurgent radicalization shown here. In 2004, it was still taboo to wantonly attack Iraqi police and government troops since they were considered fellow countrymen. By early 2005, this taboo was being swept aside, while by the end of the year, it would be entirely gone. This reflected the collapse of the formally Former Regime Element (FRE) insurgent forces and their consolidation into the SREs, specifically AQI. The death of the FRE segment in the insurgency can be dated to June 2005, when the last FRE leader–Atheer Nassif Turki–was arrested and his group subsequently disbanded.

Lastly, the third consequence of the operations–the insurgency’s increasing criminality–was felt throughout Anbar and the insurgency writ large.

The most significant shift in the insurgency was a general turn toward criminal activity to finance attacks on the Coalition. From the very beginning, the two activities had been linked. Smugglers, for instance, facilitated the entry of foreign fighters and weapons as well as more traditional goods that could be sold to finance insurgent groups. RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE, by disrupting established financial networks throughout the province, pushed insurgents to find other means for funding their movements, generally through kidnapping, extortion and robbery. […]

Ordinary corruption as at the Syrian border crossings-benefited the insurgency elsewhere. In Habbaniyah, insurgent leader Sheikh Abdul Hamid was able to bribe the police in order to lure the Coalition into a false sense of security, ordering Iraqi National Guard commanders to use "more force" in clearing out the streets to prevent the Coalition from returning to the area. And, when insurgents attempted to ambush Iraqi National Guard troops that were transporting their monthly payroll from Baghdad in March, the lieutenant in charge reported the money stolen and then kept it for himself. Mohammed Daham's brother Issa found one of the more ingenious quasi-criminal methods for raising funds. His Ramadi gas stations inflated gas prices and used the proceeds to fund his groups' activities. Some Ramadi residents were willing to pay for the higher prices at insurgent gas stations rather than waiting in longer lines for the cheaper government fuel, either out of sincere support for the insurgency or in order to escape intimidation. This led to conflict between 1920 Revolution Brigade and a small group of Syrian, Egyptian, and Sudanese AQI fighters over which group would control the gas station money. (25-26)

The dispute over the Ramadi gas stations was a sign of things to come–control over fuel would later be an extremely important source of financing and power for AQI. In turn, this conflict incited another in Ramadi, with the Albu Diab tribe on the one hand, and the Albu Aetha and Albu Faraj on the other. This was rooted in a ‘series of kidnappings of Albu Diab tribesmen by the Albu Faraj in an effort to solicit money from the families of the kidnapped to support the insurgency. In response, the Albu Diab began actively thwarting efforts by the Albu Faraj to plant IEDs and threatened to inform on them to the Coalition if they refused to return al-Shokha [member of the Albu Diab].’ (26) Another tribal rivalry also broke out into open fighting:

There had always been tension between the Albu Mahal and the Albu Salman. The Mahalwis resented the fact that the Salmanis were the "princely" section of the Dulaymi confederation and therefore given a cut from the proceeds of all illegal tribal smuggling. The leader of the Mahalwis (and an SAR insurgent), Sheikh Sabah Sattam, with the help of his brother-in-law Raja Farhan, the mayor of al-Qa'im, hired displaced insurgents into the al-Qa'im police and used it as his personal security force. He placed Mahalwis in the local Iraqi National Guard. He also attempted to take over the Husaybah police force, but found himself blocked by the rival Salmanis, who resented this intrusion into their area of influence. The result was an outbreak of low-level fighting between the two tribes that would intensify throughout the spring and result, in the summer of 2005, in a full-blown tribal war. (26-27)

The insurgency was the necessary condition for all of these episodes of bloodshed, but it was not the sufficient condition, which were the pre-existing tribal rivalries and dynamics.

Political Developments

In the spring of 2005, the new Iraqi federal government was formed, which coincided with segments of the insurgency entering into political negotiations with Baghdad. Recall that Operations River Blitz and River Bridge followed Shia political victory in the January elections and the massive insurgent defeat in Fallujah II. Many ordinary Sunnis and insurgents alike now favored some form of political engagement, which forced even hardline organizations like the AMS to partake.

Towards this end, near the end of March 2005, Harith al-Dhari [leader of the AMS], MML, and Mohammed Daham formed the Sunni Shura Council, a committee designed to represent Sunni concerns in Anbar while maintaining and advancing AMS interests in the province. The Council enlisted the support of prominent former Ba'athists and Sunni tribal leaders and initiated a series of talks that signaled their willingness for political engagement. (33)

Discussions between the Council and Baghdad began in late March and continued through April.

The common goal of many of these insurgents was the creation of Sunni Iraqi security forces in Anbar that would not only provide security and stability but also act as a bulwark against the rise of Shi'a power in the province. Members of the Sunni Shura Council thus continued to meet with senior Anbari police officials, suggesting that Anbaris be hired by the Iraqi government to fill the gaps in the police and security forces. (34)

AQI’s response to all of this was to begin targeting its former allies in the Ramadi Shura Council. In a troubling development, this did not deter SAR insurgents from working with AQI and SREs in general. In fact, cooperation substantially increased, and the SAR and SRE insurgent wings began to coalesce, which necessarily benefitted AQI, as it was the undisputed SRE leader with no SAR counterpart. AQI’s resolute opposition to the Coalition and Baghdad effectively turned it into a vehicle for Iraqi nationalism. An average Anbari who hated the invaders would naturally gravitate towards AQI, even if this Anbari was personally moderate in faith. Although its battlefield credentials were pristine, the SAR wing was by definition closer to the Coalition than AQI. Its openness to political settlement made its commitment to Iraqi national liberation suspect. Had Latif and other SAR leaders maintained a similar opposition to the Coalition as had AQI, it is possible that the insurgency would not have radicalized as extremely as it did. In other words, Islamic State may have been thwarted. Unfortunately, the history which actually took place was one where AQI won out over the other insurgents.

To be continued…

1. For more on Hamas’s rivalries with Salafi Jihadis, see:

https://twitter.com/IbnSiqilli/status/1712515427559960592?t=zZvG-GIMaOjC0ixN7avN_g&s=19

2. For more on Badr’s parent organization, see: ‘Shiite Politics in Iraq: The Role of the Supreme Council,’ International Crisis Group, 15 November, 2007.

3. Of the 110,000 members of the Ministry of Interior, most were reported to have partaken in sectarian violence against Sunni Iraqis. See: Andrew Buncombe, Patrick Cockburn, ‘Iraq's death squads: On the brink of civil war,’ The Independent, 26 Feb, 2006.

4. Mona Mahmood, Maggie O'Kane, Chavala Madlena and Teresa Smith, ‘Revealed: Pentagon's link to Iraqi torture centres,’ The Guardian, 6 May, 2013. Link: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/06/pentagon-iraqi-torture-centres-link

5. Despite popular myth, sectarianism during the Iraqi Insurgency was not a strictly Sunni initiative, nor was it a mere response to Sunni victimization of Shias. The cleansing of Baghdad (among other crimes) went far beyond any ‘eye-for-an-eye’ views of justice. See: Edward Hunt, ‘Dispatches from Baghdad: sectarian war in Iraq, 2006–2007,’ Middle Eastern Studies 56, no. 1 (2020).

6. For Abu Umar’s official Islamic State biography, see: https://archive.is/4bryh

7. Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l Jihad, AQI’s predecessor.

8. Bernard Fall, “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” Naval War College Review 18, no. 3 (1965).

9. At one point, I had access to all four entries of Salil al-Sawarim in the original HD resolutions but I regrettably did not download them.

10. James Glanz, ‘Insurgents wage precise attacks on Baghdad fuel,’ The New York Times, 21 February, 2005.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device