2004: Insurgency Faces Down America at Fallujah
Notes on the U.S. Military's 'Study of the Insurgency in Anbar Province', pt. 3
First Battle of Fallujah: Insurgents carrying RPGs prepare to resist as U.S. Marines surround the city, 6 April, 2004. Many similar scenes were taking place throughout Fallujah in anticipation of the Coalition assault. A few weeks later, the insurgents won the first showdown.
Note: Page numbers refer to Chapter 4 of the Study. Where necessary, administrative language has been omitted from quotations to ensure clarity. Content remains unchanged.
Insurgent Profile
Before turning to the insurgency in 2004, let us profile the average insurgent of that year:
In 2004, the typical street-level insurgent captured in Anbar was an Iraqi male about 28 years old, was more likely to be married than to be unmarried, and was educated at a high-school level or less. Most captured detainees were associated with tribes and also had some military experience. These conclusions are based on an analysis of more than 4,300 tactical interrogation reports gathered from intelligence sources. (56)
Further, most of the fighters were working-class and a non-insignificant amount were employed by the police or security forces, in which they likely acted as infiltrators. The latter phenomenon would worsen as the insurgency progressed. Regarding tribal backgrounds:
The tribe with the most captured members in 2004 was the Fahad tribe. The most captures of Fahad happened in April, coincident with Fallujah I [First Battle], and in the latter part of the year. In November 2004, coincident with Fallujah II [Second Battle], the Albu Alwan and Albu Khalifah tribes were most captured, while there was a significant dip in Fahad captures from 75 in October to 9 in November. Though these were the most frequent tribes claimed, there were many tribes well-represented, as only 52% of the detainees associated themselves with one of the top 20 tribes. (57)
Indeed, Fallujah and Ramadi represented well over half of the insurgents, followed by Habbaniyah, al-Qaim, and even Baghdad. This reflected the severity of violence and insurgent influence in those cities, which would worsen with each passing year, but let us return to the insurgency where we left it.
All Quiet in Anbar: Insurgent Reorientation
The disorganization of FRL groups–owing to the capture of Saddam Hussein–meant that by early 2004, Baathist restorationism had lost all influence in the insurgency. As a result, almost all FRL fighters and leaders joined the FRE, SRE, and even AQ-affiliate groups. This was part of the broader ‘Islamization’ of the insurgency, which accelerated as AQ took leadership, beginning in late 2004. However, in early 2004, Anbar Governate saw relatively little fighting as the insurgent groups, particularly SREs, focused on reorganizing and consolidating. For example, the ‘Islamic Army of Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna, and JTJ all put out propaganda (leaflets and internet statements in particular), recruited heavily, and took over mosques in preparation for launching an insurgent campaign against the Coalition.’ (3) Of these three groups, JTJ was the most active and prominent, regularly staging and claiming attacks, in contrast to 2003, when it maintained secrecy. Its targets were Coalition forces, Iraqi security forces, and Iraqi Shia:
Relatively little of this terror campaign, however, took place within Anbar proper. There were several reasons for this. First, insurgent groups typically avoid carrying out mass casualty attacks near their primary recruiting grounds and centers of support. While Zarqawi and other insurgents had few reservations about killing perceived collaborators, they didn’t target Sunnis in the way they did Shi’a or Kurdish populations. Second, JTJ was still building local alliances. These alliances – with other SRE and FRE insurgent groups and with anti-Coalition elements within powerful Anbari tribes such as the Mohamdi, the Albu Nimr, the Zobai and the Albu Eissa – might have been jeopardized by conducting mass casualty attacks in the province. Third, Zarqawi was interested in starting a civil war between Sunni and Shia and needed the support of the Sunnis. (4)
However:
Despite JTJ's public debut, the majority of day-to-day attacks inside Anbar continued to be conducted by local and provincial FRE or SRE organizations (though the line between FRE and SRE became increasingly blurred as a result of Islamization). Infighting and rivalries initially hindered FRLs or FREs coordination of activities. Religious organizations stepped into the void and began facilitating cooperation by creating loose but not well-organized coalitions between the various insurgent groups. This cooperation enabled a great deal of permeability between insurgent groups, with members of one organization often blending or merging into another depending on the situation. (5) [Emphasis mine]
The final line highlights a key catalyst in the broader Islamization and radicalization of the insurgency. Fighters frequently fought for several groups, depending on which one(s) was present for a particular skirmish or battle, or held influence in a particular settlement. An individual fighter may work with the 1920 Revolution Brigades, the IAI, JRTN, and JTJ without holding fixed membership in any one group. He would be influenced by all of them and would bring this influence to other insurgents and sympathizers. Eventually, a kind of mish-mash ideology would form–loosely, Salafi Arab nationalism–representing the various groups for which the fighter had fought. As the more ideological groups (such as JTJ) grew, so too did their influence over the overall recruiting pool, on members of other militias, and on the general ideology of the insurgency. In part, this explains the control which AQ in Iraq eventually exerted over other groups–they shared the same fighters, who were often more loyal to AQ than to their rivals. We will examine this in further detail in subsequent parts of this series.
Several loose coalitions formed to facilitate such porosity in the insurgency. One key coalition was the Ramadi Shura Council (RSC), which coordinated insurgent activities in Ramadi and in Anbar writ large: ‘Similar informal and formal shuras soon appeared in other major cities in Anbar. Though not tightly hierarchical, these shuras remained, in principle at least, subordinate to the Ramadi Shura Council and later the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura.’ (5) However, in early 2004, there were not many insurgent activities to actually subordinate to the Shura. Ramadi and Fallujah had the largest insurgent presence, but other cities were relatively quiet–for example, al-Qaim saw fewer than ten attacks on Coalition forces from January to March. Thus, the RSC primarily reflected its titular city, in which there were over 150 anti-Coalition attacks in the three-month period mentioned above. There were even more attacks in Fallujah, portending the two major battles later that year.
In the background, JTJ began to merge with AQ itself and with local Iraqi groups. At the time of the Study, few details on the former process were available, so the author’s discussion is limited. Due to the Usama bin Ladin raid, we now possess the Abbotabad Letters, which provide the missing details on JTJ’s merger with AQ. I refer the reader to Kévin Jackson’s analysis, which is the latest work on the subject.1 In brief, both parties were eager to join together: for JTJ, it gave access to AQ’s global networks and resources, while for AQ, it established presence in Iraq, a major arena for jihadi efforts. In addition to Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri, Abu al-Faraj al-Libi was the key figure in (micro)managing the merger, which was formalized in June 2004, four months before it was publicly revealed. The central leadership’s eagerness in the merger is partially explained by ‘the difficult security environment faced by al-Qa‘ida in Pakistan [which] pushed the organization to eye Iraq as an alternative terrain for its operations’ (Jackson, ‘Part 1’). Back in Iraq:
While negotiations with Al Qaeda leadership were taking place, JTJ expanded its activities in Fallujah and Ramadi. Although often characterized as foreign terrorists, by 2004, JTJ had recruited enough Iraqi members they now represented a majority of the organization's rank-and-file members. While foreign fighters constituted most of JJ's leadership, Iraqi jihadis also held senior positions within the organization. In addition to Thamir Mubarak Atronz (mentioned in Chapter 3), by early 2004 Umar Husayn Hadid al-Khurayawi al-Mahamdi (Umar Hadid) had become one of Zarqawi's most trusted lieutenants and facilitators in the Fallujah area.2 This allowed Zarqawi to recruit Iraqis into his organization by exploiting mosque connections, family ties, and tribal rifts (in addition to his ruthless command style and robust international support). (12) [Emphasis mine]
JTJ also formed the Secret Islamic Army, led by Abu Muhammad al-Adnani (Syrian foreign fighter and future spokesman of the Islamic State)3, which ‘acted as an umbrella organization to facilitate cooperation’ with Salafi Jihad, a militia with an estimated 3000 fighters in several governates and funding from across the Arab World. (13) Further, there was a broader Salafization (matching the Islamization) of the insurgency, which, although unrelated to JTJ, created a favorable ideological environment for them. Insurgent groups, such as Jaysh Muhammad, independently came under the influence of a Salafi jihadi worldview. This Salafization expressed itself in six forms:
Implementation of shari’a, especially the hadd punishments;4
Inclusion of clergy in insurgent leadership and decision-making (through the issuing of fatwas that the groups saw as binding);
New emphasis on creating an Islamic state (the Caliphate);
Establishment of a shura council;
Creation of committees to promote virtue and prevent vice;5
Belief in a Jewish-led American global conspiracy against Islam and the need to defeat it in Iraq through jihad. (15-16)
These were most common in insurgent hotbeds like Ramadi and Fallujah. However, this did not mean that the insurgency adopted AQ’s ideology–groups which did, such as Saraya al-Jihad, were in the minority:
Insurgents came to view their activities from an Islamist (rather than nationalist) perspective. They saw supporters of the Coalition as apostates instead of collaborators. They viewed the Shi'a as heretics. And, they believed the Coalition's actions occurred within the context of a global conspiracy against Islam. However, in an overwhelming majority of cases, this did not translate into support for Al Qaeda or its tactics (particularly the use of suicide bombers) or Zarqawi's strategy to trigger sectarian war and eradicate the Shi'a. Even within Al Qaeda, Zarqawi was regarded as an extremist and sectarian. This became an issue of contention and negotiation between Zarqawi and the Al Qaeda leadership when he sought to serve as their representative in Iraq. (16) [Emphasis mine]
The absence of such extremist views can be best seen in the aforementioned RSC. One of its major backers and financiers was Abd al-Latif Humayim al-Kharbit who ‘was a deeply religious Sufi with a moderate view of shari’a. He sought to restore Sunni power in Iraq and saw himself as a defender of the Qur’an.’ (5) Even the Salafi, a man called ‘Daham’ (the author does not reveal his full name), was personally quite moderate. This non-Salafi Jihadi influence would sadly not last for long. Its highpoint (and death) would be the Battles of Fallujah, where Sunni and Shia forces united to repel the Coalition.
First Battle of Fallujah
Prelude
As alluded to above, Fallujah was one of the few cities in Anbar experiencing significant violence, with regular attacks on and skirmishes with Coalition forces.
The surge in violence reached a tipping point on March 31, 2004. Albu Eissa tribesmen from Islamic Army of Iraq murdered four American Blackwater contractors. International TV (with sources among the insurgents) broadcast video images of their bodies being burnt and mutilated. As noted in Chapter 3, following the detention of Sheikh Barakat Albu Eissa in September 2003, his followers had threatened to target Coalition contractors in Fallujah. This attack made good on that threat. In response to the attack, the Coalition initiated Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE. The operation's mission was to deny the insurgency a sanctuary in Fallujah and apprehend those responsible for the murder of American civilians [sic]. (18) [Emphasis mine]
As alluded to above, tribal dynamics were central to insurgent activities and mobilization. The detention of a tribal shaykh was avenged by an attack by fighters who had likely first mobilized as a tribesmen before formally joining the IAI. The overlap between tribes and insurgent groups would be a defining trait of the insurgency. Note also the author’s odd label for the Blackwater agents, 'civilians.’ Blackwater is a private military contractor, whose employees typically have military training and carry firearms, making them combatants. The company would later become infamous for its role in the Nisour Square Massacre, in which Blackwater contractors murdered 17 Iraqi civilians. In this regard (and many others), Blackwater is a typical American defense contractor, not unlike DynCorp, but this is a subject for another time.
Battle
In preparation for the attack on Fallujah, formally begun on April 4, the Coalition isolated the city and assembled substantial forces. First, Marines ‘set up a traffic control cordon around Fallujah to isolate the city's insurgent forces and prevent their escape. While food and medical supplies were allowed into the city, only women, children, and old men were allowed to leave.’ Meanwhile, separate ‘Coalition units conducted operations in Ramadi, Khalidiyah, Karmah, and northern Babil to prevent outside insurgent groups from aiding Fallujah.’ (20) Next, 2000 Coalition troops and another 2000 Iraqi soldiers and police–supported by tanks, assault vehicles, artillery, and armed aircraft (like AC-130s)–began their assault. Significant portions of the Iraqi forces deserted, forcing Marine units to reposition to maintain the cordon. The first two days showed success, but the Coalition soon encountered major insurgent resistance:
The Coalition faced groups spanning the full range of the insurgency, from Al Qaeda to SRE, FRE, and FRL organizations. The ease with which these groups were able to operate in Fallujah was due to cooperation with local tribesmen. Tribesmen were generally anti-Coalition in outlook and supportive of the insurgency, though they preferred that violence not affect their own territory. (19) [Emphasis mine]
Within the city, there were three major insurgent networks–two FRE, one SRE (close to JTJ)–which together formed an impressive but not well organized defending force.
Fallujah lacked a city-wide organization, but its diverse array of insurgents were led by Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi, backed by the IAI, JTJ, and former Republican Guard forces. Under Janabi, the most prominent commanders were JTJ’s Umar Hadid, who led the group’s Iraqi fighters, and allegedly Zarqawi himself, who led the foreign fighters and ‘personally oversaw the defense of 5-10% of the city’.6 (21) Among the foreign fighters, there were apparently 75 Hamas members, who formed the Sheikh Ahmed Yassin Brigade, and 10 PFLP-GC members, who served as advisors to the larger insurgent groups. In total, there were up to 1000 insurgent fighters, with substantial armaments and training:
They possessed small arms, RPGs, machine guns, IEDs, and mortars. Operating in small teams and conducting hit-and-run attacks, insurgents moved from building to building as they fell back on pre-positioned weapon and supply caches. In addition, insurgents had hardened certain areas of the city with barriers, dug-in positions and traps designed to kill Coalition forces as they advanced. (20)
By this point, insurgent IEDs had increased in complexity–having progressed from simple mines to remote-controlled explosives–and would become even more sophisticated as the war dragged on. Although weakly organized, the insurgents put up significant fight:
There was no city-wide central command responsible for coordinating the activities of Fallujah’s fighters. While an organization akin to the later Fallujah Mujahideen Shura existed, it was still informal and ill-defined. A limited amount of operational planning – such as assigning defensive zones to major groups, setting up observation posts, and pre-registering mortars – took place. Once the fighting began, command and control became chaotic and decentralized with many insurgent cells acting autonomously.
Yet it would be false to claim that no command and control existed. Some cells had a clear chain of command, issued written orders, set up observation points, and used organized scouts on motorcycles. Others simply ran towards the nearest sounds of fighting, relying on smoke and fire as reference points for their RPGs and machine guns.
The insurgents generally employed a dispersed, nonlinear defense in depth, although there were some tactical advances by small mobile combat cells. These mobile combat cells carried out hit-and-run attacks, ambushes, and standoff attacks using mortars and IEDs. They did not attempt to defend, nor did the Marines attempt to clear every house in a given area. Most insurgents moved in groups of 5-10 as they ran forward, opened fire, and then retreated back into the alleys. (21)
Fighting in the city ignited the rest of Anbar Governate, ending the relative peace experienced during the early months of 2004. Insurgent networks in several other cities supported efforts in Fallujah. For example, fighters in Ramadi, Saqlawiyah, Amariyah, Qusaybah, and Karmah mounted major attacks on the Coalition to stretch thin their forces, with Fallujah as their apparent model. Further, in Husaybah, the entire police department supported ongoing insurgent strikes on the Coalition, either by providing material assistance or directly attacking Coalition forces. Cities even sent men and materiel to Fallujah:
Al-Qa'im-based Omar al-Mukhtar leader Juma Hamid Khalaf al-Mahalawi traveled to Ramadi with 40-60 fighters to support the Fallujah insurgents. Other leaders in al-Qa'im, Mosul, Kirkuk, Tarmiyah, Tikrit, Sharqat, and Hillah all sent fighters and supplies to Fallujah. During Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE, some allied insurgents were able to move with ease and remained able to enter Fallujah. They infiltrated through the Marine cordon using back roads and hidden trails not blocked by Coalition forces, smuggled weapons and contraband into the city as humanitarian supplies, and relied on bribes or collaborators within the Iraqi police forces. (22)
This support went across sect:
The Coalition attack on Fallujah stimulated Shi'a support for the Anbari Sunni. Even Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army provided support. By early April 2004, liaison had been established between the Fallujah insurgents and the Mahdi Army. This offered a loose framework for cooperation despite the obvious sectarian differences. In mid-April, Sadr sent weapons, supplies, and even some fighters to Fallujah under the cover of providing humanitarian aid. (22)
These and other political factors–notably, the Abu Ghraib Prisoner scandal and Al Jazeera’s coverage of the battle–forced the CPA to order an end to the assault on 9 April. However, fighting would conclude three weeks later with a ceasefire brokered by the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS). The total body count remains unclear. The author cites that 600-700 insurgents were killed and an unknown number wounded. Interestingly, he cites no civilian counts. Iraq Body Count–a conservative tally–reports that up to 616 civilians were killed, among them over 300 women and children.7 The Lancet’s 2004 mortality study–considered robust–reports that since the 2003 invasion, roughly 200,000 civilians had died in Fallujah and its hinterland, with many of these deaths due to the battle.8 The gap in these counts is enormous and is a subject for another time. If nothing else, it highlights the severity of the fighting.
Aftermath
The First Battle of Fallujah was perceived as an insurgent victory and insurgent prestige accordingly increased. Their internal correspondence and public propaganda reflected this confidence. They soon began to address their organizational weaknesses–particularly, infighting and unclear goals–by merging into larger groups or coalitions. The most prominent merger created the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura (FMS), which
improved the organization and coordination of insurgent groups not only in Fallujah but across Anbar. The Fallujah Mujahideen Shura had no clearly identified leader. Instead it relied on the consensus of various insurgent leaders. The absence of a single leader enabled the most extreme elements of the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura, such as JTJ, to further radicalize the rest of the Fallujah insurgency and turn the city into a magnet for foreign fighters. (24) [Emphasis mine]
One striking fact about the FMS was its relative non-sectarianism. It had two Shia groups and continued to cooperate with the Mahdi Army, which it supported with shipments of armaments and fighters to an-Najaf. This would indicate that Zarqawi’s ultra-sectarianism was not yet present in JTJ’s Iraqi commanders, such as Umar Hadid.
Another group to benefit from the battle was the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS), whose prestige significantly increased due its role in the ceasefire. ‘This brought AMS closer to its goal of being the Sunni community's main voice in Iraq. Its outspoken opposition to the Coalition appealed to many Anbaris, while the fact it stopped just short of calling for violence enabled AMS to have its cake and eat it too. AMS successfully exploited Anbari support for the insurgency while not being associated with any of its losses or atrocities.’ (25)
Yet another (indirect) beneficiary was the Fallujah Brigade, an armed group set up to support Coalition activities and establish law and order in the city. The Brigade was quickly taken over by the insurgency, largely due to Janabi. He forced the city government to accept the membership of up to 350 FRE and SRE insurgents (out of 2100 troops), and to fire all Brigade officers who were not insurgents. Further, the Brigade commander was of Janabi’s choosing. The leadership was thus totally compromised, while the membership was strongly infiltrated. Unsurprisingly, insurgent activities greatly expanded. Shari’a was enforced more widely than before the Battle. Religious police and judges were instated and empowered–in one case, Janabi himself presided over a trial. This created a highly amenable environment for JTJ:
SREs and foreign fighters loyal to Zarqawi based in the Jolan district increased their movements and activities in the city and soon began manning checkpoints on the outskirts of the town. The insurgency continued to view the battle as a major victory against the Coalition. With the ceasefire in effect and Fallujah Brigade compromised, insurgents possessed a major base of operations in Anbar from which they could conduct attacks elsewhere in Iraq. (27)
Elsewhere in Iraq, particularly the South, Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army emerged as a major threat to the Coalition. Sadr’s base were the urban Shia poor in the slums of Baghdad, Basra, Karbala, and other cities with strong Shia presence. He challenged Ayatollah Sistani and the major Shia groups such as the Badr Brigade, whom he saw as rivals for leading Iraq. However, he was not opposed to the Dawa, with whom he allied due to shared support for a strong Iraqi central government.
Interlude:
In the early summer of 2004, there were two key developments in Baghdad: first, Ayad Alawi was appointed interim prime minister; and second, the CPA was dissolved and formal sovereignty passed to the interim government. Also, due to continued fighting with the Mahdi Army, Coalition forces re-deployed from Anbar to the South, giving Anbaris the impression that full withdrawal was imminent. Closely related was the impression that Sunni power would be soon restored. These ideas would be short-lived. The interim government’s strong stance against the insurgency quickly sapped it of Sunni support, leading first to a ‘wait and see’ attitude, then to widespread apathy. Another major drain on government support was the insurgency itself.
Throughout the summer, insurgent activities greatly expanded throughout Anbar. Insurgent networks ‘intensified attacks against civilians, police, and government officials to undercut Iraqi Interim Government support.’ They also targeted Iraqi contractors to dissuade civilian and government official cooperation with the Coalition. This strategy was successful: ‘The lack of cooperation crippled many of the Iraqi security forces in Anbar throughout July and August 2004.’ (32) Further, the RSC and the FMS gained considerable influence and control. In July, JTJ was able to force the resignation of the governor by abducting his sons, and in August, his replacement stated: ‘the province has collapsed and we feel like hostages.’ (33) In Ramadi, insurgent activities also became more sophisticated:
The Ramadi Shura Council allowed insurgents to better organize. Moreover, it facilitated larger terrorist attacks. Insurgents now could operate in squad to platoon-size units, with several instances of heavy street-fighting in the city. One particular incident, on July 14, stands out for its planning, logistical support and coordinated use of firepower. This indicated that the insurgency was attempting to move to a higher form of warfare. The attack involved as many as fifty insurgents. They carried out a complex attack on a Marine combat outpost with RPGs, machine-gun fire, and grenades. They used trucks to carry fighters to the battle. The attack ended with twelve insurgents dead or wounded and twenty-one in custody, plus the capture of a weapons cache.
The relationship between the Ramadi Shura Council and the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura was that of equals working in parallel rather than a chain of command. While the Ramadi Shura Council deferred to the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura on a number of major decisions affecting specific operations, the Ramadi Shura Council was far more unified under Latif and Daham and hence able to maintain a more coordinated alliance of insurgent organizations. (33)
The situation was similar in Fallujah, where real power was with the FMS. Within the Shura, Umar Hadid took over the military wing, leading JTJ and other AQ-aligned groups to have the most street presence: ‘foreign fighters loyal to Hadid and Zarqawi patrolled Fallujah. They directed traffic and set up checkpoints. Imposing shari’a in the city, they required women to wear the hijab and implemented hadd punishments.’ (37) Likewise, Sheikh Janabi continued to direct the FMS’s campaign of abductions and murders against collaborators. He also forbid insurgents from carrying out attacks without his approval, which both restrained insurgent hot-headedness and increased his power. Unsurprisingly, Janabi and JTJ began to butt heads, particularly over anti-Coalition strategy–whether to wage full war or adopt a more pragmatic approach. However, both remained hostile towards Iraqi government forces:
A major turning point for the insurgency in Fallujah was the August 2004 attack on the 505th and 506th Iraqi National Guard [ING] compounds. JTJ and FMS fighters led by Hadid and Janabi carried out this attack. The compounds fell without a fight. Once secured, Janabi addressed the ING soldiers, informing them that a member of the ING had been cooperating with the Coalition and that the organization would now be disbanded in Fallujah. Seizing all ING weapons and equipment, Janabi told the soldiers to go home and warned that any who returned to Fallujah as ING would be killed. (38)
Other cities experienced similar escalations in the insurgency. In Hit, Habbaniyah, and Rutbah, insurgent-related transit–arms running, foreign fighter trafficking, and general smuggling–significantly increased, in large part due to tribal assistance. In Haditha, insurgents waged a murder and intimidation campaign against collaborators, forcing local elites to turn a blind eye. They also mounted major attacks on the Iraqi National Guard. In al-Qaim, the situation closely resembled that of Fallujah before the battle: ‘Using mosques as command and control centers and supply depots, insurgent leaders delivered strident anti-Coalition thetoric. Heavily infiltrated by the insurgency, the city would be used as a major base and staging area until well into 2005.’ (35) In that year, the insurgents would be expelled from al-Qaim due to a major tribal revolt. This would be the first major instance of Sunni opposition to the insurgency and would eventually be used by the Coalition to great effect. We will return to this event in the next entry of this series.
Second Battle of Fallujah
Prelude
After the First Battle of Fallujah, the emergence of the Mahdi Army as a serious insurgent threat forced the Coalition to shift focus to the Iraqi South. By late August, this threat had been sufficiently mitigated that the Coalition could re-focus on Fallujah, which had become a parallel and more powerful political authority than that of the official Iraqi government. The seizure of the ING compounds was the most brazen example of this, incurring significant Coalition concern.
However, there were major divisions within Fallujah itself, due to the renewed rivalry between Janabi and Hadid. The root cause was Janabi’s worry that Hadid was undermining the FMS’s (thus Janabi’s) popularity through several transgressions: implementing highly extreme versions of sharia; collecting religious taxes to fund JTJ; seizing the possessions of those who did not cooperate with JTJ; and killing two popular Fallujah residents due to alleged collaboration with the Coalition. In short, Hadid’s actions were steadily increasing the FMS’s number of opponents.
Prior to the Battle, the Iraqi government and the FMS repeatedly met to negotiate a peaceful turnover of Fallujah, but these were illusory: the FMS were buying time to prepare for renewed hostilities. The Coalition held off on conducting a major assault until after the 2004 elections. In the meantime, it began a series of air strikes against key insurgent leaders, most important of which was Abu Anas al-Shami, ‘JTJ's spiritual leader who had served as a close advisor to Zarqawi and provided the group with Islamic legal justification for its activities.’ (43) Al-Shami was a core member of the group and had appeared in the beheading video of Nick Berg–he remains a highly celebrated figure in Islamic State media.9 Meanwhile, the insurgents built up their defenses:
As early as the seizure of the ING compounds in August, insurgents began preparing defenses for a possible Coalition attack Defenders were made up of roughly 50% Fallujahns, 32% other Anbaris, and 18% foreign fighters. The Fallujah Brigade had now ceased to exist as an institution. With the removal of the Iraqi National Guard, Janabi, Hadid, and the rest of the Fallujah Mujahideen Shura had complete control over the city. Despite his strength in the city, Hadid began relocating foreign commanders to Ramadi to prevent senior foreign fighters from being targeted in the anticipated Coalition offensive.
The Fallujah Mujahideen Shura coordinated with allied or satellite insurgent groups in Ramadi, Khalidiyah, Habbaniyah, Saqlawiyah, al-Amariyah, Karma, Latifiyah, Abu Ghraib, and Baghdad. The purpose was to prepare for widespread attacks as soon as the fighting began [as had occurred during the First Battle - R. Ashlar]. (43)
Further, in November, JTJ publicly announced its merger with Al Qaida. Thus, Al Qaida in the Land of Two Rivers, widely known as Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI), was finally born. This increased Zarqawi’s already substantial prestige.
Battle
The Second Battle of Fallujah was significantly more brutal than the First due to a number of factors. First, there were much greater forces on both sides: roughly 4500 insurgents entrenched in the city against the Coalition’s almost 18000 troops, backed by substantial air support.10 Second, both sides were fiercely determined to hold the city, illustrated on the insurgent side by fighters often holding out to the last man. Third, following from the second, the Coalition’s tactics considerably escalated in severity. Military-age males were prevented from leaving the city, so roughly 30000-50000 civilians still remained in Fallujah immediately prior to the Battle, during which they were treated as combatants. The Coalition also set up a blockade around the city, preventing entry of key supplies and effectively using hunger and thirst as weapons of war. Further, its air campaign infamously included wide use of white phosphorus as a weapon and indiscriminate bombing of the city. These tactics eventually paid off in clear Coalition victory, but they reflected the extent of the insurgent defense.
Insurgent tactics were similar to those in the First Battle, while their strategy was to inflict Coalition casualties and draw widespread media attention and popular support.
As in the first battle for Fallujah, the insurgent’s relied on a dispersed, non-linear fluid defense. They used networks of small cells to elude, harass, and attrit Coalition forces as they advanced into the city. Insurgents mixed direct fire with small arms and RPGS, hitand-run, and indirect fire. Some cells attacked Coalition forces from within one building, relocated to another, and attacked again. Others used mortars in conjunction with the attacks described above. […]
The insurgent plan for defending Fallujah also called for the dispersal of 50% of the city’s total fighters to nearby towns and rural areas from Ramadi to Baghdad and south into northern Babil. The goal was to open a second front by attacking Coalition forces from the rear along the outer perimeter and energizing other insurgent groups into stepping up their attacks [as spontaneously occurred during the First Battle - R. Ashlar]. While coordinated insurgent activity did increase throughout the Sunni Triangle, the outer cordon of Fallujah was never seriously threatened. […]
Insurgent communications consisted of radios, cell phones, runners, and visual and auditory signaling. Numerous commercial hand-held mobile radios were captured by the Coalition from insurgent arms caches and living quarters, suggesting that they were widely available but seldom used. Fallujah’s power was cut off on November 8, degrading landline communication so that cell phones became one of the few means of communication. To supplement the cell phones, black flags were used to signal between groups and mosque loudspeakers broadcast tactical information. Former RG and SRG generals, on the other hand, issued written orders complete with Saddam-era official letterheads to subordinates who snapped salutes.
As during Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE, insurgent cells were small, semi-autonomous and widespread throughout the city. They conducted a decentralized defense. The most common cell organization was a hub network made up of cells of 3-6 fighters, though some were as large as thirty. As the fighting wore on and insurgents were left isolated in the southeastern part of the city, cell size increased to groups of as many as fifty fighters by November 13. No single leader appears to have been in control of more than fifteen fighters, with the exception of Hadid who personally led as many as 200 into battle. (46-47)
The insurgents also again received support from the Mahdi Army, which sent up to 350 fighters and major funds to the city. However, three factors substantially weakened insurgent defenses. First was the departure of Janabi, Zarqawi, and other key FMS leaders, which decreased overall insurgent cohesion and unity. Second was major rivalries within the remaining leadership alongside no coordinated communications between groups. Indeed: ‘Cooperation between Hadid’s forces and those loyal to Janabi was tenuous at best. It is unclear to what degree the two factions set aside their differences in the face of a concentrated Coalition threat.’ (47) Third was poor chain-of-command with many senior leaders directly communicating with individual cells. These factors contributed to insurgent defeat during the battle.
Aftermath
The insurgency suffered a significant blow with the fall of Fallujah. Insurgents lost their primary safe haven. Their networks were disrupted and scattered. They were deprived of major weapons caches and IED factories and roughly 4,000 fighters were killed or detained. […]
In Operation Al FAJR, the Coalition destroyed the center of insurgent power in Anbar but did not end the insurgency or eliminate AQI. Still, Operation AL FAJR was a major blow to the insurgents. They would again have to reorganize, recruit, and re-arm. The roughly 4,000 fighters killed or captured [breakdown: 2175 killed, 2052 captured - R. Ashlar] included experienced leaders like Hadid, who would take time to replace. These losses, and the ensuing reorganization of insurgent networks, were a major reason that the insurgents could not disrupt the January 2005 Iraqi elections. (47-48)
The insurgent defeat led to a large but temporary re-alignment of popular Sunni views. The AMS briefly reassessed its support for the insurgency since ‘its decision to back Janabi meant that it was tied to his defeat in Fallujah.’ (49) Indeed, the clergy as a whole temporarily soured on the insurgency, issuing statements against Islamist violence in the country. A prominent cleric, Dr. Adnan Muhammad Salman al-Dulaimi, declared that ‘there was no legitimate jihad in Iraq and that violence against Coalition forces would not be tolerated.’ (49) Many viewed the insurgency’s weakened momentum as a sign to reconcile with the Iraqi Interim Government, in which they hoped to safeguard Sunni interests.
Meanwhile, the insurgency dispersed and reorganized across Sunni Iraq. AQI relocated its base of operations to Ramadi, where it integrated with the RSC:
Ramadi Shura Council leader Latif assisted this move. Latif agreed to combine his forces with those previously loyal to Hadid. This allowed him to better dominate activities between Ramadi, Khalidiyah, and Fallujah. Many rank-and-file AQI and SRE fighters fled west to al-Qa’im and Hadithah. Others remained in Karmah or Saqlawiyah near Fallujah. Large numbers of foreign fighters headed east to rural Taji and Tarmiya north of Baghdad. Of the leaders who’d been active in Fallujah, Zarqawi is believed to have fled to Mosul, and Janabi used his tribal alliances to seek refuge in northern Babil. With the death of Hadid in Fallujah, Ramadi Shura Council leader Daham was promoted to serve as Zarqawi’s top lieutenant in Anbar. (50)
Most insurgents fled to western Iraq, where Coalition and Iraqi government forces were few and weak, but many also fled to northern and central Iraq, particularly Nineveh or Diyala, respectively. This dispersal accelerated the ongoing radicalization of non-AQI-affiliated insurgents. Even so, considerable recruitment, reorganization, and regrouping was necessary to regain lost momentum. The insurgency was thus too weak to interfere with the January 2005 elections, though by mid-2005, it would become an even greater threat than before the Second Battle of Fallujah. We shall discuss this in the next part of this series.
In 2017, Islamic State media released footage, which, according to Mr0rangeTracker (perhaps the best analyst on jihadism), unveiled Umar Hadid for the first time–thirteen years after his death:
https://twitter.com/Mr0rangetracker/status/855487282262028290?t=ZxMo1RzoHhkLTK9RPLU0PQ&s=19
During the course of our study, we will encounter many now-infamous figures in the history of the Islamic State. In a future part, we will meet Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, the first IS Amir and predecessor to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
‘HADD (PL. HUDUD) literally, “limits,” are the punishments specified in the Qur’an for five different sins: adultery (execution or beating), apostasy (execution), stealing (cutting off of the left hand), murder (beheading) and intoxication (beating). Jihadists as well as radical Islamists believe that the hudud must be applied in order to practice Islam correctly.’ (16)
‘COMMITTEES TO PROMOTE VIRTUE AND PREVENT VICE Radical Islamist groups believe they must implement shari’a on any territory they control. To ensure all citizens will follow shari’a, most Islamists create an institution to enforce Islamic law through beatings, public humiliation or even executions. This organization, traditionally named the “hisba,” is usually called by modern Islamists “The Committee to Promote Virtue and Prevent Vice,” from a Qur’anic verse that calls Muslims true believers only when they promote virtue and prevent vice (“al-amr bi’l-ma’ruf wa’lnahy ‘an al-munkar.”).’ (16)
According to Craig Whiteside, IS media has released documents written by Abu Anas al-Shami (early core member of JTJ), which revealed that Zarqawi was absent from both Battles of Fallujah. Shami himself was present, as was Adnani, who allegedly (per Daniele Raineri) was among the last fighters to flee Fallujah. Adnani was joined by Abu Jafar al-Maqdisi, a Palestinian foreign fighter from Lebanon.
https://twitter.com/DanieleRaineri/status/543423871417085952?t=LnN-xv1xsuUakqWsgBlJbA&s=19
https://twitter.com/DanieleRaineri/status/543424845430919169?t=hxUjltVHm-cj5QTlQPN4yA&s=19
https://twitter.com/DanieleRaineri/status/543425320955949056?t=hxUjltVHm-cj5QTlQPN4yA&s=19
Lily Hamourtziadou, ‘Besieged: Living and Dying in Fallujah’, iraqbodycount.org. Accessed: 24 Oct., 2023, Link
Les Roberts, Riyadh Lafta, Richard Garfield, Jamal Khudhairi, Gilbert Burnham, ‘Mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: cluster sample survey,’ The Lancet 364, no. 9448 (Nov., 2004). For the 2006 follow-up study, see: Gilbert Burnham, Riyadh Lafta, Shannon Doocy, Les Roberts, ‘Mortality after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: a cross-sectional cluster sample survey',’ The Lancet 368, no. 9545 (Oct., 2006).
In 2017, Daniele Raineri identified (linked below) the five participants in the Nick Berg video. From left to right, they were: Abu Usama al-Tunisi, Manaf al-Rawi, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu Anas al-Shami, Abu Muhammad al-Lubnani. The image of Nick Berg with his killers is historic, for it portends IS in several key respects. First is the influence on future IS execution videos: black-clad executioners, hostage wearing an orange jumpsuit, graphic depiction of a beheading, and ready access from the internet. Second is the large presence of Levantines, which reflects JTJ’s origins as a Levantine organization and foreshadows IS’s future conquests in Syria. Third is the presence of a Tunisian in the JTJ core, which marks their early and eventually massive influence on IS history. ‘In Iraq, there were so many Tunisian jihadis from just one town—Ben Gardane, on the desert coastline near the Libyan border—that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of Al Qaeda in Iraq, reportedly said, “If Ben Gardane had been next to Falluja, we would have liberated Iraq”’ (George Packer, ‘Tunisia and the Fall After the Arab Spring’, The New Yorker, 21 March, 2016). Tunisian foreign fighters later caused a major internal conflict due to their adherence to Hazimiyah, which Baghdadi considered too extreme for IS (Aaron Zelin, ‘Ultra Exremism among Tunisian Jihadis within the Islamic State’, jihadica.com, 18 Feb., 2020).
https://twitter.com/DanieleRaineri/status/821315966663585793?t=Oj4nQ8DlDhSo1S8c_MzB9w&s=19
Joel D. Rayburn, Frank K. Sobchak, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2019) I: 389.
Excellent article