"Lions of the Ansar in the Land of Two Rivers" – Part 1
The story of the Rawah Camp, as told by original co-founder Abu Muhammad al-Salmani
There are two narratives of the iconic Rawah Camp, perhaps the earliest nucleus of the Islamic State. The first and (relatively) better known is Memoirs of a Mujahid by Abu Hafs al-Iraqi, transmitted by jihadist-sympathetic journalist Husayn al-Ma’adhidi. It is an extended book describing the full history of the Camp. The second and more obscure narrative is by Camp co-founder Abu Muhammad al-Salmani. This is a brief pamphlet focusing on how the Camp came to be infiltrated by a spy then bombed by the Coalition. Salmani’s story has a number of fascinating details, filling some gaps in our understanding of the early Iraqi jihad. However, it is first worth dwelling on the transmission of the narrative from Salmani to the broader jihadist social media ecosystem.
The brief introduction to the narratives is written by anonymous members (or “brothers”) of Ansar al-Jihad, presumably a jihadist supporter group based in the Middle East. The authors state that Salmani first told the story by word of mouth, seemingly in an audio recording, which they dutifully transcribed and edited, then handed over to Al-Fajr Media Center. It was this entity that bestowed the mouthful title “Lions of the Ansar in the Land of Two Rivers.” From there, the story made its way onto jihadist and Islamist forums, like muslm.net, which is where I found it on an old archived page. The narrative was posted on 9 September, 2006.
The most striking detail in the editors’ introduction is that at the time of publication (some time in 2006), Abu Muhammad al-Salmani was still alive and militarily active. After his name, the editors write “may God protect him,” meaning that he was alive, then add “and shield him from the hearing and sight of the tyrants,” meaning he was still freely working as a jihadist. This is quite unusual. Typically, such narratives are published after the author or central characters are dead. It is unclear why the editors released this story while Salmani was alive, though they almost certainly had his authorization in some form. One possible explanation is that publication was motivated by the then-newly founded Sahwa movement, which astute jihadists would have realized presented a key threat to Mujahidin Shura Council (dominated by Al Qaida in Iraq). Tribal leader Sattar Abu Risha announced the Sahwa in early September 2006, so perhaps Salmani and the anonymous editors felt it necessary to publish an especially notorious incident of spies infiltrating jihadist networks. However, if the Sahwa did indeed publication, it would have been mentioned in the editors’ introduction, so something else likely motivated the release.
In any case, Abu Muhammad al-Salmani’s story reveals a good deal about the earliest days of the jihad in Iraq. Without reading the story, we can see that the author–thus, a Rawah Camp co-founder–is Iraqi, as indicated by the Salmani moniker, referring to a powerful Sunni tribe in the country. It’s notable that both narratives of the Rawah Camp are written by Iraqi co-founders, Salmani and Abu Hafs al-Iraqi, meaning that there was already an active jihadist underground that could coordinate with foreign fighters. Further below in the story, Salmani mentions two other Iraqi jihadists, Abu Ahmad al-Karbuli and Abu Ahmad al-Salmani, but this is jumping far ahead.
The Rawah Camp began with just two figures, Salmani and an Abu Ahmad, who were inspired by propaganda materials by Usama bin Ladin and Abdallah Azzam. They studied writings about the jihadist camps in Afghanistan and decided to do similarly in Iraq once their group grew to six members. Note that these efforts were entirely self-started. There was no impetus or "seed funding" from AQ or an associated jihadist movement. These preparations began before the invasion. Interestingly, they were done in secret, as Salmani and his comrades felt that the Baathist government would harshly suppress their efforts.
Indeed, Salmani and the others were quite hostile to the Baathists, perceiving them to be a greater threat to their efforts than were the Americans. He references a fascinating (albeit unnerving) debate among the group over whether or not it was "better for Iraqi to be bombed." The crux of it was that while the jihadists had no hope of toppling the Baathist government, American jets and tanks could, thus facilitating their project. In other words, the Coalition invasion was the necessary prerequisite for the Islamic State, as the jihadists admit that they otherwise had no chance against the Baathist government. It is noteworthy that the exact same debate as Salmani’s group was being held by Iraqi jihadists in Baghdad and presumably other cities.1 This hostility to the Baathists persisted well into the invasion and it was mutual. Salmani reports that once foreign fighters began to enter Iraq, he would interrogate them on their intentions for jihad, particularly whether they would fight for the Baath. Meanwhile, the Baathists rejected any attempts by Islamist or jihadist inclined youth to join them out of fear of later betrayal. No “united front” against imperialism was formed, as both movements had their own distinct political aims beyond simple national liberation. In the jihadists’ case, it was the formation of an Islamic emirate, while in the Baathists’ case, it was the preservation of Baathist rule.
Salmani's brief reference to the integration of foreign fighters into his network raises questions. How exactly did they come into contact? Who established the network by which fighters entered Iraq? What regional contacts did they have? Salmani makes no mention of international contacts, but he must have been informed that foreigners, including veterans of Afghanistan, had arrived to fight the Americans. The most likely explanation is that he found out by word of mouth, as the entry of dozens of foreign jihadists would not be kept secret for long, especially for those already acquainted with the Iraqi underworld.
During this time, Salmani's group was searching for a permanent training camp location, and they eventually decided on Rawah due to its isolation and its proximity to the border with Syria. Training commenced with apparently great success, but then came a suspicious Syrian, known as Abu Mu'adh. In Salmani's telling, Abu Mu'adh neatly fit the archetype of an informant or spy of some kind. His unusual and destructive behavior, such as picking fights and stirring arguments, would be familiar to any left-wing activist. Upon the bombing of the Rawah Camp, Salmani accuses Abu Mu'adh of being responsible, owing to his bizarre behavior. As indicated by the subtitle, Salmani accuses Abu Mu’adh of having been a Syrian spy in the employ of infamous Syrian cleric Abu al-Qa’qa’, long suspected to have been a Mukhabarat agent (his story will be told in the introduction of Part 2). This figure’s role is not discussed in this part, so I will save the analysis for the subsequent part.2
At one point, Salmani mentions the presence of Abu Muhammad al-Lubnani and Abu Anas al-Shami, who is described (without explanation) as the "general emir" of the Camp. They obviously came as foreign fighters, but no details are provided. Salmani does not explain how they came to be so trusted or to have achieved such authority in Shami's case. Also notable is that Zarqawi is not mentioned anywhere in this narrative. This network seemed to have operated independently of Zarqawi, though it is possible that he was aware of it through his close friend Abu Anas al-Shami.
Remaining details to be discussed in Part 2…
The Full Story of the Bombing of the Rawah Camp in Iraq and the Martyrdom of 80 Mujahidin, and the Story of Destroying the Spy Network
The Story of the Bombing of the Rawah Camp Due to Spies and the Connection of the Major Syrian Agent Mahmud Qul Aghasi (Abu al-Qa'qa') to these Spies – All of this is narrated by one of the leaders of the Mujahidin in Iraq.
May Peace and God’s Mercy and Blessings be upon you.
Your brothers in Ansar al-Jihad are pleased to present to their Muslim brothers in the East and West the full transcript of the testimony of the mujahid commander and the memorizer of the Quran, Abu Muhammad al-Salmani (may God protect him and shield him from the hearing and sight of the tyrants). This testimony concerns the story of the beginning of jihad in the path of God in Al-Anbar Governorate in the Land of Two Rivers, specifically in the city of Al Qaim and particularly in the area of Rawah.
The brothers at the Al-Fajr Media Center decided to title the testimony "The Lions of the Ansar in the Land of Two Rivers." Your brothers in Ansar al-Jihad have transcribed, reviewed, and refined the speech, adding commentary in certain places. For clarification, Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Salmani (may God protect him) spoke in a colloquial dialect during his address to the general Muslim public, while also using classical Arabic. This led us to replace some colloquial words with classical Arabic equivalents. Additionally, the Shaykh (may God preserve him) did not always complete his thoughts based on what was previously in his mind, so we documented it based on what was previously mentioned.
To the brothers at Al-Fajr Media Center: If this statement reaches you, we ask that you present it to the honorable Shaykh Salmani (may God protect him) so that he may kindly refine it to match his thoughts. Otherwise, the testimony will remain as it is in the audio statement. God speaks the truth, and He guides to the right path. Our final call is that all praise is due to God, the Lord of the Worlds.
In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful:
All praise is due to God, the Lord of the worlds, and the best outcome is for the righteous. There is no aggression except against the oppressors. Praise be to God, the Originator, the Restorer, the Self-Sufficient, the Praiseworthy, the Possessor of vast forgiveness and severe punishment. Whoever He guides is rightly guided and blessed, and whoever He leads astray is lost and distant. Whoever He directs to the paths of salvation and grants success is the rightly guided. He knows what is apparent and what is hidden, what is concealed and what is revealed, what is vile and what is pure–and He is closer to all than the jugular vein!
He has divided creation into two groups and assigned them two abodes: a group in Paradise and a group in the Blazing Fire. Whoever does good does so for his own soul, and whoever does evil bears its consequences. I bear witness that there is no god but God alone, with no partner, and I bear witness that Muhammad is His servant, His messenger, His chosen one, His close friend, and the best of His creation. I bear witness that he conveyed the message, fulfilled the trust, advised the Ummah, and strived in the path of God with true struggle until the certainty (of death) came to him from his Lord.
Now, let us begin:
The Path I Will Speak About Now – It is my story and the story of the young men who were with me in this mission.
Initially, my brother Abu Ahmad and I gathered whatever information we had about the "Lions of the Ansar in Afghanistan"–their beginnings with Shaykh Usama and Shaykh Abdallah Azzam (may God have mercy on him)–before the American forces entered Iraq. We would discuss this matter frequently because this concern never left us–so we decided to take the initiative and act!
Abu Ahmad and I read about the training camps in Afghanistan, how they were established, and how the brothers later met with the Taliban. We resolved to move forward. We then brought in a third brother, who agreed that we should begin. Then we added a fourth, a fifth, and a sixth. And so we became six brothers in total.
We began discussing and consulting on how this experience would unfold. One of the brothers suggested, "Let’s go to a remote area in the desert, set up a tent, gather our supplies, and start working!" The idea was to test the brothers' endurance and strength–both in military training and in worship (such as night prayers, fasting, etc). It was a good idea, but how would we do it? The Iraqi forces were present in the area, and the Baathists were everywhere!
So, we decided to create a fake cover story for our activities. We said, "We are going to plow the land and plant wheat in the desert!" and so on. We gathered the minimal supplies needed for this operation, but we never actually went through with this test.
Then, the American forces began bombing various regions of Iraq. Among ourselves, we debated, "Is it better for Iraq to be bombed or not?" We believed that the American forces were less dangerous to us personally than the Baathists. The Baathists had infiltrated every household–no one could speak a word or take any action without severe consequences. This was extremely difficult.
It wasn’t that the American forces were weaker than the Baathists–no, they were far stronger, with more advanced, destructive, and technologically superior weapons. But the Americans had no real influence over the people–they were not accepted by them. This was our line of thought at the time.
We proposed to the brothers that we establish a training location. After agreeing on a specific place, I told them, "I will go there first. Send me three to seven brothers–I can shelter them, train them in weapons, and then we can bring others and train them as well." But the brothers delayed and sent no one.
When I returned to the area, I found that they had already taken action–something I was unaware of! But, Inshallah, it was for the best. I asked them: "Why did you delay sending anyone to me?" They replied, "Nothing in particular, but events [that is, the invasion] prevented us from sending the brothers."
I returned to Al Qaim. Young men began arriving from outside Iraq–from the [Arabian] Peninsula and nearly all Arab countries, as well as other Muslim nations (or rather, Muslims from those lands). We gathered in a house and began questioning them, "Where are you going?" They said, "We are going for jihad!"
We asked them: "You are going for jihad–to fight alongside these Baathists? With Saddam and his allies?" We knew the Baathists’ hostility toward Islam, their hatred of Muslims, and the atrocities they had committed against them in the past–even during these very events!
The Baathists used to call us "bubbles!" and other derogatory names.3 They refused to let any young men join them, fearing that these youths might turn against them–perhaps even kill them.
In any case, the work began. We started selecting an emir and establishing a shura, among other things. Some Arab brothers with experience in Afghanistan joined us, including the martyred Abu Raghd,4 Abu Yunus, Abu Hakim, Abu Ubaydah, and many others–most of whom were later killed, leaving only a few of the Ansar remaining.
We decided to move from this house to a larger location–to the villages and rural areas. We found another house where we stayed for several days, and the brothers conducted whatever training was possible there.
The British forces began to appear in the area, surrounding that house. Some brothers might wonder: Why were British forces even there?! The British forces deployed in Al-Anbar, particularly in the city of Al Qaim, because they had prior experience and knowledge of that area–and because they had long-established agents there!
There was a discussion about leaving that house, as staying could have caused us harm. Certainly, if we had remained, it would have brought us trouble and difficulties! The brothers were prepared for military action if necessary, but we did not want operations to begin at that stage–we were still in the phase of training, gathering weapons, and searching for capable personnel. We were planning for something bigger than just an operation.
We went looking for a larger place than the house and found a camp. We searched several locations but ultimately chose an area called Rawah. There, we found a suitable place for operations and training, far from civilians. We built hiding spots within the camp where we could conceal ourselves during the day and train at night. Daytime training was also possible since the area was secluded.
We had experience in setting up military sites, especially those that could be concealed from the enemy–locations that would be difficult for them to discover. The enemy lacked sufficient expertise to detect potential mujahidin positions.
Training began in a manner pleasing to God. The young men displayed extraordinary enthusiasm and possessed moral character unlike anything I had ever seen or heard of. Their conduct reminded me of the biographies of the Companions (may God be pleased with them)–they never backbit, and one brother would stand guard all night in place of another. They were willing to sacrifice their blood for one another. The spirit of selflessness, brotherhood, and love–all the values brought by Islam–were embodied in them. Some never let go of the Quran except during prayer, many were devout worshippers, and most were frequent fasters–Mashallah!
This camp completed its training in just over a month–around 45 days. We then began searching for another camp or location and found one. New recruits entered in batches–though we had many young men eager to join, we avoided gathering too many in one place out of concern for their safety.
Training in this new camp also proceeded in a way pleasing to God. We received support and encouraging words from some scholars who backed this effort–they were keen on establishing jihad in the path of God in Iraq.
This region–Al Qaim and Rawah–became the beacon and foundation of jihad in Iraq. From here, the jihad spread to all Iraqi cities, especially Fallujah.
Many events took place in the camp, and while I won’t recount all of them (as that would take too long), some incidents are worth mentioning. Many have heard about what happened in the Rawah Camp, but now I will explain the reason–the story that ignited the anger of Muslims and spurred them to action. It also stirred feelings among those who had been unaware of this camp and the reason behind its bombing.
There was a man who came from Syria. He got to know some of the brothers in Iraq, especially in the city of Al Qaim. Around the time of the events [the Coalition invasion] or shortly before them, he became acquainted with a group of brothers and entered their homes. His visiting their homes and sitting with them seemed like an endorsement from them for this man.
One time, he entered the camp we had in Rawah and went into the leader’s room, from which he took communication devices–devices that he himself had brought. These devices were purchased with the money of the Muslims and brought to the brothers for their benefit.
When the leader of the camp entered his room and saw the equipment missing, he asked, “Who entered my room and took these items?”
One of the people said, “I did.”
The leader replied, “What made you go into the room? How do you enter without permission? And how do you take items like that?”
The man said, “These items are mine!” The leader responded, “No, they are not!” He insisted, “They are mine–I bought them!”
I went to him and asked, “These items are yours?” He said, “Yes!” I asked, “Where did you get them from?” He said, “I bought them from Syria.” I asked, “With your own money?” He said, “Yes!” I said, “Who did you buy them for?” He said, “For the cause.” I replied, “So they are for the cause?” He said, “Yes!” I said, “Then they have become waqf [endowed] for the Muslims. How can you now claim they are yours?! That invalidates your argument–they are no longer your personal property, they are a trust!”
He fell silent. I told him, “Don’t ever do this again.” All the brothers were angry with him, especially the leader–most of them were from the Arabian Peninsula. The leader said to me, “We don’t want this brother to remain with us. He’s causing problems–and this wasn’t the first time.”
I went to the higher-ranking leader and told him, “This brother’s behavior is unacceptable–it’s wrong.”
He said, “This man is well known in the group and has precedence and status…”
I said, “Even if he brought money, even if he has a history of contributions–the money isn’t his; it’s the money of the Muslims. He is working, and his situation is just like any of the other brothers.” And that was the end of the matter.
Later, I and one of the brothers went to another camp, which I was managing in a certain area near Al Qaim. The brothers there were very dedicated and disciplined. I brought that man into my camp–I wanted him to be under my supervision and within my sight.
One day, I was sitting with one of the brothers, and he asked me, “What do you think of so-and-so?” I said, “By God, not even for a moment did he enter my heart.” He said, “That’s strange–why?” I replied, “I feel the words that come from his mouth don’t come from his heart or chest. They’re memorized words–not coming from sincere feelings.” He said, “Subhanallah!” I said, “That’s what I’ve seen.”
Brother Abu Raghd and a group of other brothers also didn’t see him as a genuinely committed Muslim. He was constantly criticizing and attacking others: “This one’s from al-Azhar,5 that one’s from Hijaz, this one is this, that one is that…” He would talk negatively about people. He wasn’t pleased with anyone.
We once had a nighttime operation or training exercise at the camp I managed. We prepared the exercise by creating two groups equal in number and equipment. We removed the firing pins from the weapons of one of the groups without telling them. The second group was told the weapons were functional and that they had to ambush their brothers and fire–not directly at them, but into the air. This was to observe the reaction of the first group, who didn’t know there was an ambush, or whether it was a friend or enemy–complete surprise.
The exercise started. Praise be to God, the reactions were good. The young men started asking: “How? What happened? We’re brothers! How could there be gunfire? No... this is serious!” The training ended, and we returned to camp.
In the morning training after Fajr prayer–the schedule was: Fajr, a short sermon of 5–10 minutes, followed by physical training–two incidents occurred.
The first incident: the brother overseeing the physical training, from Aleppo, Syria, asked me, “Uncle Abu Muhammad, is everyone training?” I said, “Yes! Even I am!” Then the man known as Abu Mu’adh staged a little act while running–he claimed that he twisted his leg and couldn’t continue running. I noticed it was fake. He even accused one of the brothers of giving him the evil eye! That brother was exemplary in character, emotional, soft-hearted, but fierce against the disbelievers and humble with his fellow brothers. He remained silent, bitterly, but later complained to me.
The second incident in morning training: there was a young man–or rather, a brave man, unmatched in courage–brother Abu Suhayl, may God have mercy on him and grant him Paradise in the Highest Ranks. Abu Suhayl was Muhammad, son of Abu Muhammad al-Lubnani. He had come from Denmark, where he had lived his entire life. He knew Arabic from his mother and father, who raised him properly as a Muslim.
This young man was lying on the ground. The physical trainer, Abu Fida’–a black belt in karate–was jumping on the stomachs of the brothers as part of building strength and spirit. He jumped on Abu Suhayl, who laughed and made a noise with his mouth. Then Abu Mu’adh, who was also lying on his back nearby, got up and started punching Abu Suhayl’s stomach.
I asked him, “Why are you doing this?! What has gotten into you?!”
He said, “He’s not strong... he...”
I said, “What business is that of yours?! The trainer is the one in charge and he’s the one who decides whether someone should endure or be disciplined–not you!” I then disciplined him and told the trainer, “Don’t let anyone act on their own without your permission.” He replied, “Sorry, Abu Muhammad. I’ll make sure of that next time, Inshallah.”
Many incidents occurred with this man known as Abu Mu‘adh–events that drew my attention, the attention of brother Abu Muhammad [al-Lubnani], and that of several other brothers. They regarded his actions with suspicion, sensing that something lay beneath them–something sinister..
Among these actions was a night training exercise. The plan involved dividing the brothers into two groups. One group had the firing pins of their weapons removed without being told. The other group was lying in wait, fully armed and informed of the plan: to ambush the first group–an element of surprise–and fire on them, not directly at their bodies, but into the air.
The operation went ahead, and praise be to God, it was successful. But during the march to the location, this man, Abu Mu‘adh, began chattering along the path and fired a flare, raising alarm and doubt from the brothers. These actions were highly suspicious.
Before that training, I had told brother Abu Muhammad: “I will be going to Al Qaim for some matters–take care of the camp in my absence. You’re the emir now.” He said, “Inshallah.”
The following day, when I returned, the brothers told me what had taken place during the operation. I turned to Abu Muhammad and asked, “What happened?”
He replied, “Brother, I fell ill, so I entrusted the responsibility to Abu Mu‘adh.”
I said, “Subhanallah! You couldn’t find anyone else?”
He said, “That’s just how things turned out. But even before the operation, he spoke to the brothers harshly–and you were there. He said things like: ‘You must march. Don’t look back. Don’t help anyone if he injures his leg… or this… or that…’–coarse and indecent language that provoked the brothers' anger.”
The brothers said, “Who is this emir?! How can he speak like that?” I had to step in and calm them: “Brothers, that’s not what he meant. He’s just trying to strengthen your resolve and motivate you.” Abu Mu‘adh replied, “Yes! That’s exactly what I meant, as Abu Muhammad said.”
I asked, “And what happened after that? What did Abu Mu‘adh do?”
When I entered the main checkpoint of the camp, I found no guards there. I asked why, and they said, “Abu Mu‘adh gave the order.” Another incident: he instructed the brothers to dig positions during the daytime, while cars were passing on that road–an act that could easily have drawn unwanted attention.
I summoned Abu Muhammad, Abu Mu‘adh, and another brother. I told them: “I want to speak with you.” I said, “Abu Mu‘adh, you’ve behaved inappropriately. I have deep concerns about your conduct.”
He asked, “Like what?”
I replied, “First, what happened with Abu Suhayl. That behavior was disgraceful, and it reveals something unsettling within you. He’s a young man who couldn’t bear the treatment you gave him. Second, you emptied the guard post and reassigned the brothers without any justification. Third, the digging of positions during the day in plain view of passing vehicles... And many other actions–along with what you had already done in the first camp.”
He said, “I admit I made mistakes. I will not repeat them.”
I said, “No. You will not remain in the camp. You’ll go to brother Abu Anas6 and work things out with him. But here, in this camp, there is no longer a place for you.”
Brother Abu Muhammad and all the brothers agreed with the decision. They unanimously condemned his behavior and supported his expulsion from the camp.
The brothers in this camp had a daily routine. After the Fajr prayer, there was morning training, followed by a theoretical lecture on weapons, then breakfast. After Dhuhr, they rested a little. Then came ‘Asr, and following that, a lecture in Islamic jurisprudence, a lesson in Tajwid, and a session for Quran memorization–I myself taught the rules of Tajwid.
After Maghrib, there was further physical training and weapons practice. After ‘Ishā’, everyone would go to their assigned guard post. The brothers were divided into groups, and each would sleep at their respective post. At 2:00 or 2:30 a.m., Qiyam al-Layl [night prayer] and Tahajjud would begin, continuing until Fajr.
That was the daily regimen of the camp.
After the incidents with Abu Mu‘adh, one of the camp supervisors or administrators went to the first camp, which was led by brother Abu Raghd. A dispute broke out there between brother Abu Ahmad, Abu Raghd, and his group. So I sent word and summoned him. I told him plainly: “Do not go back to the camp. I will serve as the intermediary and the administrative coordinator for both camps. If you need anything from the camp, or if you want to send a message, I will handle it.”
I assigned him a task: “You are responsible for procuring weapons. Take this car and go search for arms–whether in Mosul, in Haditha, wherever you hear of weapons for sale or available through donation. Go and bring them.”
He asked, “What made you assign this to me?”
I said, “Brother, we want to work–we don’t want to get stuck in ‘I am the emir,’ or ‘I’m this, I’m that.’ These are not things to worry about. We should work together sincerely, just as we once did–for the sake of the cause, and for the sake of God Almighty.”
He said, “Alright, brother, I’ll accept.”
I had spoken to him sternly, with harsh words, but after he accepted the decision, I apologized–and he accepted my apology.
This man known as Abu Mu‘adh went to Al Qaim, and I truly don’t know what he was doing there. So I went to the general emir, Abu Anas, and said to him: “Brother, this man has behaved inappropriately–he’s done this… and that… and more. He’s caused things that arouse suspicion and doubt.”
But Abu Anas replied, “Brother, I consider him to be half of the group. To me, as the saying goes, he is in one scale, and the rest of the brothers in the other.”
I replied, “Fear God, brother! That is not something you should say.”
He said, “Brother, he brings in support, funding, and...”
I said, “He brings in support?! Is it from his own money? From his father’s house? No–it is the money of the Muslims. He merely delivers it. He is like any other person, like any other striving mujahid working on this path. He has no special status–no exception, no privilege.”
Abu Anas then said, “Alright, brother. Leave him here–we’ll send him to Syria, or wherever we need him to provide support.”
I concluded, “Then keep him with you.”
This man caused many problems among the brothers, not just the ones I mentioned. But over time, he began to withdraw–he stopped interacting much with the others.
After the brothers completed their training in the first camp, they launched several operations against the American enemy.
Among them was the first operation, in which seven brothers took part, including Abu Raghd, Abu Ubaydah, Abu al-Abbas, Abu Tamam, and Abu Hakim. It targeted an American convoy made up of four armored vehicles. The brothers completely destroyed it–no one survived.
The second operation also targeted eight vehicles, and praise be to God, they too were destroyed, and those inside killed.
One of the brothers, Abu al-Abbas, stood in the middle of the street and took out the first vehicle with a rocket. Then he destroyed a second–then a third, all while the enemy was watching him. But he remained firm, unshaken in spirit, his resolve unbroken, until he and the other brothers completed the operation.
Another operation targeted six vehicles, including a fuel tanker, in the city of Hit. After the operation, the people began to shout takbir, and the women let out cries of joy. They invited the brothers to breakfast–but the brothers refused, saying: “We did not come here for that.”
These are just some of the operations carried out by the brothers from the first camp.
Then followed these incidents:
The brothers Abu Ahmad al-Karbuli and Abu Ahmad al-Salmani went to the city of Al Qaim to purchase some weapons. They entered the al-‘Ubaydi area, acquired the weapons from a contact, and left in a car–unaware that American forces had already caught wind of the operation. A checkpoint and roadblock had been set up for them.
As the brothers reached the checkpoint, they found themselves unable to retreat. A third person was driving the vehicle. When the soldiers stopped them and ordered them to open the trunk, Abu Ahmad drew a pistol from his side and shot the American officer dead. Then, he leapt out and engaged another soldier in a struggle over his weapon. But additional American troops quickly overwhelmed him, beat him down, and brought him to the ground.
Soon, one of the brothers came to us and reported that Abu Ahmad had been killed, and the other Abu Ahmad was captured. We immediately mobilized to rescue him. It was around two o'clock in the morning, and the other brothers had gone out on a night training exercise. I rushed to them, called them back to the camp, and selected fourteen of them to go with me. We prepared weapons and ammunition and headed to the site where the incident had occurred.
I halted the brothers at a certain point and went ahead with Abu Qasim to scout the route. When we arrived at the scene, we found that the American forces had already withdrawn. We returned to the brothers and informed them: “The Americans have left. There is nothing for us to do here.” So we went back to the camp.
There, I was met by Abu Umar, the slain brother’s brother, and also by Ahmad, his son–who was no more than fourteen years old. His father had left him in my care, saying: “Take care of him–I want him to grow into a young mujahid, striving for the sake of God.” We did not tell the boy of his father's death until the next day. When we finally did, he cried out: “Allahu Akbar!” Tears streamed from my eyes, and from the eyes of the other brothers as well.
Later, Abu Raghd, Abu Yunus, and Abu Hakim came to me and said, “Brother Abu Muhammad, we must change the locations of our camps. The captured brother might divulge the site either while conscious or under torture.”
I agreed. At the time, we had only two vehicles, so I said to Abu Raghd, “Begin immediately. Move the brothers from the first camp first, then those from the second. I’m going to Al Qaim to bring Ahmad to his mother–she has requested him.”
He replied, “Alright, brother, I will handle it.”
But I advised him: “Try not to gather all the brothers in one place. If something happens, we don’t want to suffer massive losses.”
He said, “God willing.”
I went to Al Qaim, to the home of Abu Ahmad, and visited his family. He had been married to four women and had sixteen children. One of his wives was my brother’s daughter. The next day I returned to Al Qaim on some errands, then went back to Karabila, preparing to return to the brothers.
Suddenly, Abu Usama arrived. His appearance had changed–he looked stunned and full of sorrow. I asked him: “What’s happened, Abu Usama? What is it?”
He lowered his head and said, “Brother… the camp was bombed!”
I exclaimed in shock, “Subhanallah! The camp was bombed?! How could that happen?!”
He replied, “It happened, brother.”
In my fury I cried out, “Why are you here?! You should have died with them!” Then I immediately apologized, “Forgive me, brother–I didn’t mean that. By God, no one could have caused this but Abu Mu‘adh!”
He said, “I feel the same way, brother! By God, I believe it was him!”
So I said, “Alright, let’s go tell the emir what happened.”
We went to him and found him sitting with his brother Abu Mu‘adh and Abu ‘Umar. Abu Usama told him, “Brother, the camp has been bombed!”
There was an outcry, and the brothers began to weep. I said to them: “Why are you crying? Now is not the time for tears. We need to go find the brothers, see who is still alive, who is wounded, and uncover the cause of this catastrophe!”
They agreed. I said again, “I suspect Abu Mu‘adh is responsible.”
Abu Anas replied, “Alright. Go and see what happened. Find out who survived.”
So Abu Usama and I took a car and headed to the city of Rawah, arriving late at night. The people of Rawah–may God reward them–had already pulled the bodies from the camp and buried them in a cemetery next to the town. The brothers had established a special area next to the main cemetery, and called it “The Martyrs’ Cemetery.”
That night, I walked among the graves, searching the faces of the fallen to identify the dead from the living. I saw things that left me in awe–two brothers, killed in the explosion, had died embracing each other, locked in each other’s arms. They were buried just like that, in the same grave.
I saw that the weapons used in the bombing were lethal–possibly white phosphorus, or napalm, or something similar. I found survivors with burn marks and strange discolorations on their bodies. I examined the corpses and identified those I could, but some were unrecognizable–decapitated, or horrifically disfigured.
I searched for the younger brothers. One of them, a Syrian named Abdul-Qadir, was just fourteen years old, if I remember correctly.
I also searched for Abu Suhayl, but could not find him. Not long before the bombing, he had told us of a dream. I had been sitting with his father when he said, “I saw a huri [heavenly maiden] calling out to me, saying: Come, Muhammad! Come, Muhammad!”
His father, Abu Muhammad al-Lubnani, said, “Do you want to go to your mother?”
He replied, “No, Father.”
His father said, “If you want, I’ll send you to her. But if you prefer, stay here in the camp.”
He said, “By God, Father–I didn’t come here just to go back to my mother!”
That dream, it seems, was a divine sign that he would soon be martyred...
I searched thoroughly in the cemetery until one of the brothers said to me: “You must leave. People are watching you. They’re talking, saying: ‘That’s the emir!’ And they’re pointing–‘That one’s Syrian, that one’s Iraqi, that one’s Saudi…’ Everyone saying what they will.”
He repeated, “You must leave.”
So I left, along with Abu Usama, and we took another brother from Rawah. I went looking for the surviving brothers. Some were still in Rawah, others in villages near the camp. I gathered them all, and that same night, took them to a safe location, left them there, and appointed one of the brothers to supervise them.
To be continued…
Regular readers will have noted this in the “Biographies of the Distinguished Martyrs” series on this page.
For several accounts of this bizarre character, see the following:
“Who’s who: Abu al-Qaqaa,” The Syrian Observer, 4 October, 2013. Link: https://archive.ph/hUTPz
Sami Moubayed, “Syria’s Abu al-Qaqa: Authentic Jihadist or Imposter?,” The Jamestown Foundation, 27 June, 2006. Link: https://jamestown.org/program/syrias-abu-al-qaqa-authentic-jihadist-or-imposter/
Andrew McGregor, “Controversial Syrian Preacher Abu al-Qaqa Gunned Down in Aleppo,” The Jamestown Foundation, 16 October, 2007. Link: https://jamestown.org/program/controversial-syrian-preacher-abu-al-qaqa-gunned-down-in-aleppo/
“Bubbles,” meaning that the jihadists were easily broken and weak.
Likely Abu Raghd al-Jazrawi
That is, Al-Azhar University in Egypt
That is, Abu Anas al-Shami